A. Constitution of India—Article 226—Writ of Quo Warranto—Public Office—Eligibility—Burden of Proof— A writ of quo warranto can succeed only when the appointee lacks the requisite qualification or suffers from a legal disqualification to hold the public office—The writ petitioner, even if a stranger, must establish such disqualification by unimpeachable evidence—Only upon such prima facie proof does the onus shift to the appointee and appointing authority to rebut the alleged illegality—Personal grievance arising from an unsuccessful selection cannot substitute this requirement. [Paras 13–15]. B. UGC Regulations—Minimum Qualifications—Assistant Professor—NET/SLET/SET—Ph.D.—Essential Qualification— For appointment to the post of Assistant Pro...
A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988—Section 13(1)(d)—Public Servant—Pecuniary Advantage—Essential Ingredient— Conviction under Section 13(1)(d) cannot be sustained unless prosecution establishes that the public servant obtained for himself or any other person a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage—Where High Court itself recorded a categorical finding that no pecuniary advantage was obtained by the accused, the essential ingredient of Section 13(1)(d) was absent—Conviction under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 120-B IPC was therefore unsustainable. [Paras 2, 4–6, 8–9]. B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988—Section 13(1)(d)—IPC Sections 420, 477A, 120-B—False Bills—Loss to Department—No Pecuniary Advantage— Mere submission or certification of...
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Settlement—Memorandum of Settlement—Conviction and Sentence—Recall/Restoration— Where the accused and complainant arrived at a settlement in proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act and the accused furnished demand drafts of ₹22 lakh and ₹3 lakh towards the settlement—The Supreme Court restored the dismissed Special Leave Petition and, with the consent of the parties, disposed of the appeal in terms of the Memorandum of Settlement—The conviction and sentence were consequently set aside. [Paras 1–6]. B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Compromise—Appellate and Revisional Proceedings—Setting Aside Conviction—Release— Upon recording the settlement between the accused and complainant, ...
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Section 389—Suspension of Sentence—IPC, 1860—Section 304-B—Conviction—Prolonged Incarceration—Statutory Appeal— Where the appellant was convicted under Section 304-B IPC and sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment, and had already undergone more than five years, i.e. over 50% of the sentence—His statutory appeal under Section 374(2) CrPC was pending and, having regard to the substantial pendency of criminal appeals before the High Court, its early disposal was unlikely—The reasonable apprehension that the appeal might not be decided before expiry of the sentence justified suspension of sentence and release on bail. [Paras 3–10]. ...
A. Service Law—Recruitment—Para Teacher Category—Non-Para Teacher Category—Eligibility—Age Limit—Merit— Where 50% posts were reserved for para teachers and the remaining posts for non-para teachers, a candidate who applied under the para teacher category could also be considered against non-para teacher posts—Such consideration was permissible where the candidate possessed the requisite qualifications, satisfied the applicable age limit by the last date of submission of application and stood higher in merit than the last selected candidate in the non-para teacher category—Separate application for the non-para teacher category was not required. [Para 8]. B. Service Law—Recruitment—Para Teacher—Non-Para Teacher—Earlier Judicial Decision—Binding Effect&mda...
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Section 389—Suspension of Sentence—POCSO Act, 2012—Section 6—IPC, 1860—Sections 363, 342, 376(2)—Prolonged Incarceration—Pending Appeal— Where the appellant was convicted under Section 6 POCSO Act and Sections 363, 342 and 376(2) IPC and sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment—Having undergone approximately 8 years and 4 months of sentence, the Supreme Court, without expressing any opinion on merits, considered the period of incarceration sufficient to warrant suspension of sentence—The appellant was accordingly directed to be released on bail during pendency of the appeal, subject to terms and conditions imposed by the Trial Court. [Paras 2–5]. ...
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Section 389—Suspension of Sentence—Life Imprisonment—Prolonged Incarceration—Pending Appeal— Where the appellant was convicted under Sections 364-A, 507 and 201 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life—Having already undergone more than 13 years of incarceration, the Supreme Court considered the prolonged custody as sufficient ground to suspend the sentence during pendency of the appeal—The appellant was accordingly granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. [Paras 1–4]. ...
A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 482—Anticipatory Bail—Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940—Sections 18A, 18(c), 27(b)(ii), 28—Vehicle Owner—Sale of Vehicle—Investigation— Where the appellant was implicated merely on the basis of his alleged ownership of a Bolero vehicle seized during investigation, while he asserted that the vehicle had already been sold long before the occurrence—The appellant had also cooperated with the investigation—In these circumstances, rejection of anticipatory bail by the High Court was set aside and interim protection from arrest was made absolute. [Paras 3–6]. B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 482—Anticipatory Bail—Interim Protection—Cooperation with Investigation— Where the appellan...
A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Section 389—Suspension of Sentence—Life Convict—Prolonged Incarceration— Convict undergoing life imprisonment for offences under Sections 120B, 364A, 392 and 302 IPC was granted suspension of sentence after remaining in custody for more than 17 years while appeal remained pending since 2020 — Prolonged incarceration by itself constituted sufficient ground for suspension of sentence pending appeal — Bail was accordingly granted. [Paras 4–5] B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Section 389—Suspension of Sentence—Restrictive Bail Conditions—Cancellation— Suspension of sentence was made subject to stringent conditions including restriction to remain within Delhi, daily reporting to the SHO, disclosure of residential details and ...
A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Bail—Husband—Unnatural Death of Wife—Matrimonial Cruelty—Prolonged Custody—Trial Delay— Where the appellant-husband was in custody since 22.09.2025 in connection with the unnatural death of his wife and the trial proceedings had been stayed by the High Court on the informant’s revision seeking addition of Section 103 BNS—Conclusion of trial in the near future was found unlikely—Having regard to the uncertain progress of the trial, the appellant was directed to be released on bail subject to appropriate conditions. [Paras 6–10]. B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Bail—Prolonged Incarceration—Stay of Trial Proceedings—Uncertain Trial— Pendency of proceedings challenging the charges, coupled ...
A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005—Section 29—Appeal—Limitation—Condonation of Delay—Welfare Legislation— Rejection of an application seeking condonation of delay in filing an appeal under Section 29, though interlocutory in form, finally terminates the statutory appellate remedy and is amenable to revisional scrutiny—In proceedings under the beneficial and welfare-oriented Domestic Violence Act, Courts should ordinarily prefer adjudication on merits rather than shut out an appeal on limitation—Procedural technicalities should not defeat substantial justice. [Paras 18, 21–25]. B. BNSS, 2023—Section 438(2)—Revision—Interlocutory Order—Condonation of Delay—Final Effect— The character of an order is not determined merely by its l...
A. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 306—Abetment of Suicide—Marital Cruelty—Proximate Cause—Cumulative Circumstances— Conviction under Section 306 IPC can be sustained where the conduct of the accused and circumstances preceding suicide establish abetment having a proximate causal connection with the deceased taking the extreme step—Relationship with another woman, quarrels, neglect, disappearance of the accused and resultant mental agony were required to be considered cumulatively—Where such circumstances, read with suicide note and oral evidence, established the accused’s conduct as the proximate cause, conviction was upheld. [Paras 14–18]. B. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 306—Abetment of Suicide—Suicide Note—Evidentiary Value—Delayed Forwardin...
A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985—Section 20(b)(ii)(B)—Criminal Procedure—BNSS Section 479—Suspension of Sentence—First-time Offender—One-third of Maximum Sentence— Where the convict is a first-time offender and has undergone imprisonment for more than one-third of the maximum sentence prescribed for the offence, the benefit of Section 479 BNSS may be considered for suspension of sentence—In an offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) NDPS Act carrying maximum sentence of 10 years, completion of more than one-third of the maximum period justified suspension of substantive sentence during pendency of appeal. [Paras 4–8]. B. BNSS, 2023—Section 479—CrPC Section 436-A—Convict—Suspension of Sentence—Pending Appeal—Delay not attributable...
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 148—Appeal against conviction under Section 138—Pre-deposit of 20%—Director who is not drawer/signatory of cheque—Applicability— Section 148, which empowers the Appellate Court to order deposit of a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation, applies to an appeal by the drawer against conviction under Section 138; where the appellant-director was not the signatory of the cheque and was admittedly not the drawer, the condition of 20% pre-deposit could not be imposed upon him and the appellate order directing such deposit was set aside. [Paras 9–14] ...
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Dishonour of cheque—Section 139—Statutory presumption—Rebuttal— Where the accused issued a cheque towards repayment of the amount received for investment, the cheque was repeatedly dishonoured for insufficiency of funds, and the statutory presumption under Section 139 remained unrebutted by cogent material or defence evidence, conviction under Section 138 was held sustainable. [Para 12] B. Penal Code, 1860—Sections 406, 420, 34—Criminal breach of trust—Cheating—Common intention—Father-son relationship—Mere introduction or relationship—Insufficient evidence— Mere introduction of the accused's son to the complainant or existence of a friendly relationship does not establish dishonest intention, entrustme...
A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005—Section 12—Interim Maintenance—Domestic Violence—Prima Facie Proof—Independent Income— Relief under the DV Act, including maintenance, is dependent upon prima facie establishment of domestic violence; where the wife’s allegations of cruelty were not corroborated by the contemporaneous compromise or other supporting material and both parties were financially independent, she was not entitled to interim maintenance or other relief. [Paras 9–12] B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005—Sections 3, 12—Domestic Violence—Maintenance—Physical, Mental or Economic Abuse—Proof— Maintenance under the DV Act can be granted where physical, mental or economic abuse constituting “domestic vio...
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Sections 30, 37—Dishonoured cheques—Suit for recovery—Liability—Original transaction—Proof— Where the suit is founded upon dishonoured cheques, the liability thereunder is statutory and the suit is not one upon the original transaction; once execution and issuance of the cheques are established and their issuance is not specifically denied, failure to independently prove the original loan transaction does not defeat the claim. [Paras 8–10] B. Limitation Act, 1963—Article 40—Suit on dishonoured instrument—Limitation—Date of dishonour—Separate cheques— A suit upon a dishonoured instrument is governed by a three-year limitation period commencing from the date of dishonour; claim relating to a cheque dishonoured on 11.08....
A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—Order VII Rule 11(a)—Rejection of Plaint—Cause of Action—Meaning and Scope—Meaningful Reading of Plaint— For determining whether a plaint discloses a cause of action, the plaint must be read as a whole and at face value; if it contains the foundational facts which, if proved, would entitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed, the plaint cannot be rejected merely because the claim may ultimately fail on merits. The enquiry is confined to disclosure of a real cause of action and not its eventual proof. [Paras 14–21] B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—Order VII Rule 11(a)—Rejection of Plaint—Cause of Action—Pleadings—Written Statement—Defence of Defendant— While considering an objection under Order VII Rule 11(a), the Court i...
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Partnership Firm—Partner—Vicarious Liability—In-charge and Responsible for Day-to-Day Affairs— Complaint specifically alleged that petitioner-partner was in-charge of and responsible for day-to-day affairs and operations of the partnership firm—Partnership Deed also described petitioner as a working partner responsible for and entitled to carry out day-to-day functioning of the firm—Such specific averments and supporting material were sufficient to decline quashing of proceedings—Defence that petitioner was inactive partner could not be conclusively determined at the stage of inherent jurisdiction. [Paras 10–16, 21] B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 528—Inherent Powers—Quashing of Proceedings u...