(1) SUPREME COURT
Culpable homicide
A. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 304 Part II—Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder—Nature of Offence—Held: Where the accused, during a sudden altercation, pushed the deceased into a dry canal, resulting in fatal head injuries caused by the fall, and the prosecution failed to establish that the alleged stone blows inflicted by the accused caused the fatal injuries, the act was held to have been committed with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death—Accordingly, the conviction was held to fall under Section 304 Part II IPC. (Paras 11–13). B. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 304 Part II—Sentencing—Reduction of Sentence—Held: While maintaining the conviction under Section 304 P...
(2) SUPREME COURT
Criminal proceedings
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 406—Transfer of Criminal Proceedings—Held: A complainant or victim cannot dictate the place of trial merely on the basis of an unsubstantiated apprehension of threat—Where the alleged offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court, the material witnesses were located there, and the plea of threat perception was not supported by cogent material, no case for transfer of the criminal proceedings was made out—However, to ensure a fair trial, the Trial Court was directed to provide appropriate security to the complainant and other witnesses whenever they are summoned to depose before the Court. (Paras 3–7). ...
(3) SUPREME COURT
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib)—Family Court Proceedings—Opportunity to Lead Evidence—Held: Although repeated defaults by a party may justify closure of evidence, the Court may, in the interest of justice, grant one final opportunity subject to stringent conditions—Where the husband failed to avail multiple opportunities to lead evidence in a matrimonial dispute, the Supreme Court, while affirming the need for procedural discipline, granted a final opportunity to adduce evidence within a stipulated period, subject to deposit of Rs.50,000/- as costs and payment of the entire arrears of maintenance payable to the minor child—The Family Court was directed to complete the recording of the petitioner's evidence within 30 days thereafter. (Paras 4–8). ...
(4) SUPREME COURT
Compensation
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Section 166—Assessment of Compensation—Functional Disability—Loss of Future Earning Capacity—Held: In determining compensation for permanent disability, the Court must assess the functional disability affecting the claimant's earning capacity and not merely rely upon the percentage of permanent physical disability certified by the medical expert—Where the claimant, a skilled carpenter, suffered above-knee amputation of his right leg, rendering him incapable of performing carpentry work which necessarily required sitting and manual dexterity, his functional disability was rightly assessed at 100% notwithstanding the medical assessment of 70% permanent physical disability—Compensation towards loss of future earning capacity was accordingly recalculated by adopting the...
(5) SUPREME COURT
Condonation of delay
A. Limitation Act, 1963—Section 5—Condonation of Delay—Held: Condonation of an inordinate delay cannot be granted on the basis of vague, casual or perfunctory explanations—Where the University sought condonation of a 1368-day delay in filing a writ appeal without furnishing satisfactory reasons, the High Court rightly refused to condone the delay and the Supreme Court declined to interfere, holding that no sufficient cause had been made out under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. (Paras 2–5). B. Pensionary Benefits—Qualifying Service—Artificial Break in Service—Held: An employer cannot deprive an employee of pensionary and terminal benefits by creating an artificial break in service—Where the respondent had continuously served the University from February 1990 to 2005, was denied per...
(6) SUPREME COURT
Suspension of sentence
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 389—Suspension of Sentence Pending Appeal—Held: Where the appellant was convicted under Sections 323 and 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC, awarded a maximum sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment, had already undergone six months' imprisonment, and his criminal appeal before the High Court was unlikely to be heard expeditiously, the Supreme Court held that refusal to suspend the sentence would render the appeal infructuous if the entire sentence were served before its disposal—Accordingly, the High Court's order refusing suspension of sentence was set aside and the appellant was directed to be released on bail during the pendency of the appeal, subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court. (Paras 2–7). ...
(7) SUPREME COURT
A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 432 (Corresponding to Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023)—Permanent Remission—Consideration by Appropriate Government—Held: A convict who has undergone the requisite period of imprisonment is entitled to have his case considered for permanent remission in accordance with the applicable remission policy—Where the petitioner had undergone 17 years of imprisonment after conviction under Section 302 IPC, the Supreme Court directed the State of Odisha to expeditiously consider his case for permanent remission in terms of the applicable policy, in accordance with the principles laid down in In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail. (Paras 3–8). B. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987—Role of Legal Services Authorities—Permanent R...
(8) SUPREME COURT
Compensation
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Section 166—Permanent Disability—Functional Disability—Held: While assessing compensation for permanent disability, the determinative factor is the functional disability affecting the earning capacity of the injured and not merely the percentage of physical disability certified by the medical expert—Where the claimant, a mason, suffered above-knee amputation of his right leg, rendering him incapable of performing manual labour, his functional disability was rightly assessed at 100%, notwithstanding the medical assessment of 70% permanent physical disability, and compensation towards loss of future earning capacity was recalculated accordingly. (Paras 21–26). B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Section 166—Assessment of Compensation—Future Prospects and Future Med...
(9) SUPREME COURT
Interim Bail
A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 483 (Corresponding to Section 439 Cr.P.C.)—Grant of Bail—Interim Protection—Held: Where the High Court set aside the order granting bail and the petitioner demonstrated parity with a co-accused who had already been granted interim protection by the Supreme Court, the Court directed that, in the event of arrest, the petitioner be released on bail on such just, fair and reasonable terms as may be imposed by the Investigating/Arresting Officer—The matter was ordered to be tagged with the connected Special Leave Petition for consideration. (Paras 3–8). B. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023—Sections 61(2), 105, 238 and 318(2) read with Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994—Sections 18, 19 and 21—Conditions of Interim Bail&mda...
(10) SUPREME COURT
Forgery
A. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471—Forgery and Use of Forged Documents—Sentencing—Principle of Proportionality—Held: While offences involving forgery and use of forged documents in judicial proceedings are serious and undermine the sanctity of the administration of justice, the sentence imposed must be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the attendant circumstances—Where the occurrence was more than a decade old, the appellant had no criminal antecedents, the forged document was detected at the threshold without causing irreversible pecuniary or proprietary loss, and the appellant had already undergone over two years of incarceration, the substantive sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone, while maintaining the conv...
(1) HIMACHAL PRADESH
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Section 173—Appeal Against MACT Award—Opportunity to Lead Evidence—The Insurance Company challenged the award on the ground that it was denied a proper opportunity to adduce evidence—The Tribunal had closed its evidence without ensuring that summons issued to the witnesses were either duly served or returned unserved—The Court held that a reasonable and effective opportunity to lead evidence must be afforded, particularly where the assistance of the Court is necessary for securing the attendance of witnesses—Accordingly, the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication of the specified issues, subject to strict compliance with procedural requirements. Held: Denial of a fair opportunity to lead evidence vitiates the proceedings to that extent and warrants remand. [Paras 1...
(2) HIMACHAL PRADESH
A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985—Sections 20 and 25—Successive Bail Applications—Change in Circumstances—A successive bail application is maintainable only upon the existence of a substantial and material change in circumstances having a direct bearing on the earlier order refusing bail—The change must be genuine and significant, affecting the merits of the case or the considerations governing bail—Mere cosmetic, trivial, or inconsequential developments are insufficient to justify reconsideration of a previous rejection—Held: A subsequent bail application cannot be entertained in the absence of a substantial change in circumstances. [Paras 8, 9, 12, 13] B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985—Section 37—Bail—Principle of Parity—The ...
(3) JHARKHAND
Rape
A. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 376—Rape—Delay in Lodging FIR—A delay of three months in lodging the FIR does not, by itself, undermine the prosecution case where the delay is satisfactorily explained—In the present case, the prosecutrix had made repeated efforts to register her complaint before the local police authorities and subsequently approached the Superintendent of Police and even the Chief Minister due to police inaction—Such circumstances adequately explained the delay and preserved the credibility of the prosecution version—Held: Mere delay in lodging the FIR, when properly explained, is not fatal to the prosecution case. [Paras 16–17] B. Evidence Law—Sole Testimony of the Prosecutrix—The settled principle is that a conviction for rape can rest solely on the test...
(4) JHARKHAND
Condonation of delay
A. Limitation Act, 1963—Section 5—Condonation of Delay by State Authorities—An appeal filed by the State with a delay of 435 days was dismissed as the State failed to establish “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5—The Court held that mere reference to bureaucratic procedures, movement of files between departments, or administrative formalities cannot justify an inordinate delay—The absence of any explanation for the initial period of more than one year was fatal to the application—Administrative lethargy and official laxity do not constitute valid grounds for condonation. [Paras 5–7, 12, 13] B. Limitation Act, 1963—Section 5—Government Not Entitled to Special Treatment—The law of limitation applies equally to all litigants, including the Government&md...
(5) JHARKHAND
Condonation of delay
A. Limitation Act, 1963—Sections 5 and 29—Condonation of Delay—Government Departments—Government departments are not entitled to any special or extended period of limitation merely because they are State entities—Administrative or bureaucratic delays, routine movement of files, or engagement in election work do not, by themselves, constitute “sufficient cause” for condoning an inordinate delay—The explanation offered must be bona fide, supported by material evidence, and demonstrate due diligence on the part of the applicant—Held: Mere administrative lethargy or procedural delays cannot justify condonation of delay. [Paras 3–6, 12–18] B. Limitation Act, 1963—Condonation of Delay—State and Private Litigants—The status of a litigant, whether a private ind...
(6) GAUHATI
Service Law
A. Service Law—Pay Scale—Additional Increments—Benefits Reserved for Scientists—An Administrative Officer employed with the Tea Research Association cannot claim the benefit of two additional increments under the CSIR communication dated 21.11.2008, which is specifically applicable to Group IV Scientists—The mere fact that Administrative Officers and Scientists draw identical pay scales does not entitle the former to benefits exclusively earmarked for the scientific cadre. [Paras 9–10] B. Service Law—Equality and Discrimination—Negative Equality Not Permissible—The allegation of discrimination between the petitioner and certain other officers was rejected, as the benefits extended to those officers were the result of discretionary decisions taken by the Chairman and were not founded...
(7) GAUHATI
Service Law
A. Service Law—Disciplinary Proceedings—Scope of Interference under Writ Jurisdiction—Proportionality of Penalty—The Writ Court may interfere with a disciplinary penalty where the findings do not establish mala fide conduct, negligence, or wilful default on the part of the delinquent employee—A penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the time scale was set aside and the matter remanded for reconsideration, the Court emphasizing that the doctrine of proportionality must be applied, particularly when the punishment adversely affects post-retirement benefits and pensionary entitlements. [Paras 19–23] B. Service Law—Promotion—Eligibility after Penalty Period—Retrospective Promotion—The mere completion of a three-year penalty period and restoration of eligibility does not automati...
(8) GAUHATI
Condonation of delay
A. Limitation Act, 1963—Section 5—Condonation of Delay—Sufficient Cause—An application seeking condonation of a delay of 1,163 days in preferring an appeal must disclose a bona fide and reasonable explanation constituting "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act—Mere negligence, inaction, or lack of diligence cannot be excused—Although courts adopt a liberal approach in matters of condonation, such liberality cannot override the requirements of reasonableness, bona fides, and due care. [Paras 16, 20, 25, 31] B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order XX Rule 1—Pronouncement of Judgment—Notice to Parties—A litigant who initially participates in the proceedings but subsequently neglects to pursue the matter and fails to ascertain the date of pr...
(9) CALCUTTA
A. Limitation Act, 1963—Articles 54 & 47—Recovery of Money—Commencement of Limitation—The period of limitation for a suit seeking recovery of money commences from the date on which performance is refused or the consideration fails—Where an agreement is terminated and a demand for refund is made within a stipulated period, such termination and failure to refund constitute the relevant starting point for computing limitation—A suit instituted within three years thereof is not barred by limitation. [Paras 10, 12, 13] B. Specific Relief Act, 1963—Breach of Agreement for Sale—Admission of Liability—Where the defendants, in their written statement, admit receipt of the consideration amount, and the plaintiffs substantiate their claim through oral and documentary evidence, the court is...
(10) ANDHRA PRADESH
Second appeal, Burden of Proof
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 100—Second Appeal—Substantial Question of Law—The existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 100 CPC—Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below, upon proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, do not warrant interference unless such findings give rise to a substantial question of law. [Paras 13, 15, 22, 23] B. Specific Relief Act, 1963—Specific Performance—Oral Agreement of Sale—Burden of Proof—A plaintiff seeking specific performance on the basis of an oral agreement of sale must specifically plead and prove the existence of a valid contract and payment of consideration—In the absence of reliable oral or documentary evidence establ...
