(1) SUPREME COURT
Suspension of sentence
A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Suspension of sentence—Special leave petition against refusal by High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad to suspend sentence—Petitioner sought interim relief pending disposal of criminal appeal—Delay in filing condoned. B. Held, Court not inclined to interfere with High Court’s order refusing suspension of sentence—Special leave petition dismissed—No fault attributable to petitioner in delay noted. C. Liberty granted to petitioner to actively pursue criminal appeal before High Court—If High Court fails to decide appeal within one year from communication of this order, despite active pursuit by petitioner, he may renew application for suspension of sentence before High Court. D. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are disposed of—Clarifi...
(2) SUPREME COURT
Anticipatory bail, Murder
A. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Sections 302 and 34—Murder—FIR lodged by father of deceased alleging involvement of several accused in killing of his son—Investigation and charge-sheet disclosed specific role of respondent-accused in the commission of offence—Existence of eye-witness attributing direct participation of accused in the alleged murder. B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Anticipatory bail—Respondent-accused granted anticipatory bail by the High Court of Judicature at Patna—Non-bailable warrants had already been issued and proceedings under Section 82 CrPC initiated against them—Despite such circumstances and ongoing efforts to arrest them, anticipatory bail granted on statement made by Assistant Public Prosecutor. C. Held, grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence ...
(3) SUPREME COURT
A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985—Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 23(c), 24, 27A and 29—Conviction relating to commercial quantity of contraband—Application for suspension of sentence—Appellant convicted under NDPS Act and sentenced by Special Court—High Court declined suspension of sentence and bail during pendency of criminal appeal—Legality of such refusal examined. B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Suspension of sentence pending appeal—Appellant in custody for more than seven years—Appeal against conviction pending before High Court with no likelihood of early hearing—Prolonged incarceration during pendency of appeal held to be a relevant consideration for grant of bail. C. Appeal—Order of High Court of Judicature at Patna refusing suspension of sen...
(4) SUPREME COURT
Murder
A. Penal Code, 1860—Sections 302/149 & 148—Murder—Unlawful assembly—Common object—Vicarious liability—Deceased was chased and shot dead by a group of accused who had arrived together at the bus stand armed with firearms—After the first shot was fired, all accused chased the deceased into the house of a witness where multiple shots were fired resulting in death—Evidence of eye-witnesses consistently established that the accused persons had alighted from the same bus armed with weapons and acted in concert—Held, their conduct clearly established the existence of an unlawful assembly with a common object to kill the deceased—Under Section 149 IPC, participation as a member of the unlawful assembly is sufficient to attract liability even in absence of proof of specific overt act ...
(5) SUPREME COURT
Criminal conspiracy
A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988—Section 7—Illegal gratification—Demand and acceptance—Proof— In a trap case relating to demand of bribe by an Income Tax Inspector during scrutiny proceedings, the High Court acquitted both accused on the ground that conspiracy and demand were not proved—Held, demand of bribe by the Inspector (A2) on 27.12.2010 was clearly testified by the complainant and corroborated by trap laying officer and independent witnesses regarding pre-trap and trap proceedings—Recovery of tainted currency from A2’s coat pocket, positive phenolphthalein test and relevant conduct of the accused constituted sufficient proof of acceptance of illegal gratification—Acquittal of A2 set aside and conviction under Section 7 PC Act restored. (Paras 17–20, 23–29) B....
(6) SUPREME COURT
Offence by company
A. Companies Act, 2013—Sections 241, 242, 244 & 59—Oppression and mismanagement—Interim protection— Appellants claiming 40% shareholding in holding company alleged illegal removal of their shareholding, fabrication of statutory filings, unlawful appointment/removal of directors and alienation of project assets valued at about ₹1000 crores—Company Petition alleging oppression and mismanagement pending before NCLT—NCLAT set aside NCLT’s refusal to grant interim relief but restricted protection to direction against taking “perceptive steps” for one month—Held, since the principal dispute regarding corporate control and asset transactions remained pending before the NCLT, the paramount consideration is preservation of the subject matter—Status quo directed to be maintaine...
(7) SUPREME COURT
Service Law
A. Service Law—Seniority—Direct recruits vs internally selected candidates—Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Service Regulations, 1967—Regulations 10(9), 87 & 97— Dispute concerned inter-se seniority between Assistant Engineers (Electrical) appointed through direct recruitment in 2000–2001 and those promoted through internal selection in 2002—Held, as per Regulations 10(9) and 87, a person is deemed to be on duty and appointed to service when he commences training, probation, or discharges duties of the post—Training forms part of service and cannot be excluded for determining date of appointment—Accordingly, direct recruits were appointed from the date they joined and commenced training, and their seniority could not be shifted to a later date when probation began. (Paras 21–22) ...
(8) SUPREME COURT
Arbitral award
A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Sections 16, 34 & 37—Arbitral tribunal—Composition—Interpretation of arbitration clause— Dispute arose regarding appointment of Presiding Arbitrator under Clause 8.3(b) of the agreement—Clause provided that if the two party-appointed arbitrators fail to appoint the third arbitrator within 30 days, the Secretary General of ICSID may appoint the third arbitrator upon request of either party—Held, clause is enabling and not mandatory; appointment by ICSID becomes operative only when a party makes a request—In absence of such request, the power of co-arbitrators to appoint the Presiding Arbitrator does not stand extinguished after expiry of 30 days—Interpretation adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal was reasonable and plausible—Challenge to j...
(9) SUPREME COURT
A. Reservation for Other Backward Classes—Creamy layer—Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993—Clarificatory letter dated 14.10.2004—Scope and effect— Respondent candidates in Civil Services Examination denied OBC (Non-Creamy Layer) status after Department applied Income/Wealth Test by including parental salary income on the basis of clarificatory letter dated 14.10.2004—Held, 1993 OM lays down the substantive framework for identifying creamy layer and primarily adopts a status-based exclusion, with income/wealth test operating as a residual criterion—A clarificatory letter cannot override or modify the parent executive instruction—Paragraph 9 of the 2004 Letter must be read only as explanatory and cannot be interpreted to make salary income alone determinative of creamy layer status—Determ...
(10) SUPREME COURT
Dying declaration
A. Evidence Act, 1872—Section 32—Dying declaration—Evidentiary value and reliability— Dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence and can form the sole basis of conviction if it inspires full confidence of the Court—No rigid rule that it must be recorded by a Magistrate or supported by medical certification of fitness, though such certification is desirable—Declaration may be oral or written, brief or detailed, and can be made to any reliable witness—However, where multiple dying declarations are inconsistent, recorded in suspicious circumstances, in presence of interested persons, or without medical certification, the Court must exercise extreme caution—If the declaration does not appear voluntary, truthful and free from tutoring or prompting, it cannot be safely relied upon to sus...
(1) CALCUTTA
A. Administrative Law—Blacklisting—Petitioners banned from carrying out fumigation treatments under NSPMs-12 and 22 without prior notice or hearing—Clause 2.5 of NSPM-12 requires issuance of show cause notice and suspension thrice within five years before blacklisting—No suspension recorded for petitioners—Held, blacklisting order quashed for violation of natural justice and statutory guidelines. [Paras 5, 15, 28–29] B. Criminal Law—Presumption of innocence—Petitioners involved in ongoing criminal proceedings—Court held that presumption of innocence applies until guilt is proven after proper trial—Blacklisting based solely on allegations without adjudication impermissible. [Paras 17, 19, 28] C. Principles of Natural Justice—Blacklisting and banning without fair hearin...
(2) BOMBAY
A. Employees Compensation Act, 1923—Sections 2(1)(d), 4, and 8—Dependents and legal heirs—Original claimant deceased during pendency of proceedings—Claim initiated by deceased dependent survives and may be continued by legal representatives or heirs—Legal heirs need not independently qualify as dependents to be impleaded and pursue the claim. [Paras 12–18] B. Employees Compensation Act, 1923—Sections 4 and 8—Welfare legislation—Objective to provide financial relief for employment-related accidents—Claim should not extinguish merely due to claimant’s death during pendency—Legal representatives permitted to step into claimant’s place to ensure justice and fulfill purpose of Act. [Paras 19] C. Employees Compensation Act, 1923—Sections 2(1)(d), 4, and 8&...
(3) BOMBAY
A. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Sections 10(1)(c), 12(5), 25B and 25F—Workman entitled to protection against illegal termination—Petitioner employed as sweeper for over 11 years, alleged payment below minimum wages, harassment, and termination without notice or retrenchment compensation—Reference made by Deputy Commissioner of Labour for adjudication of reinstatement and back wages. [Paras 2–4, 11–14] B. Evidence and burden of proof—Muster rolls, salary vouchers, duty list, and oral testimony produced as secondary evidence—Labour Court allowed reliance on such evidence, drawing adverse inference against respondent for non-production of records—Respondent denied employer-employee relationship; court held existence of employment relationship established on preponderance of probabilit...
(4) BOMBAY
A. Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952—Section 8F—Recovery from third parties—Third party filed affidavit denying liability under Section 8F(3)(vi)—Held, statutory protection afforded to such affidavit—Authority cannot compel payment unless it proves that the sworn statement was false in a material particular—Burden of proof lies on the authority; suspicion alone insufficient. [Paras 19–21] B. Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952—Section 8F—Recovery from third parties—Authority must demonstrate that third party either owes money to employer or holds money for/on behalf of employer—Legal relationship under which funds are held must be real and identifiable—Recovery cannot be based solely on suspicion. ...
(5) CALCUTTA
A. Commercial Courts Act, 2015—Section 2(1)(c)(vii)—Commercial dispute—Suit arising out of agreement concerning immovable property used exclusively for trade or commerce—Plaintiff acknowledged existence of registered lease deed and accepted rent/occupation charges after expiry of lease—Issue involved interpretation of lease deed and jural relationship between parties—Held, suit qualifies as commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii). [Paras 18, 24–29] B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882—Section 106—Lease agreement post notice under Section 106—Determination of jural relationship between landlord and tenant—Plaintiff claimed eviction of defendants as trespassers but referred to registered lease deed—Held, lease agreement must be interpreted to decide nature of rela...
(6) CALCUTTA
A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Section 34—Challenge to arbitral award—Tribunal relied on personal knowledge and expertise instead of material evidence—Held, such reliance violates fundamental policy of Indian law and principles of natural justice—Arbitral tribunal must adjudicate solely on evidence produced by parties and in accordance with contract terms. [Paras 17–59] B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Section 18—Equal treatment of parties—Tribunal applied double standards by accepting appellant’s pre-retrieval reports and discarding respondent’s post-retrieval reports without valid justification—Delay in producing reports corresponded with retrieval of Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM)—Violation of Section 18 observed. [Paras 61–71] C....
(7) CHHATTISGARH
Criminal conspiracy
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)—Sections 120-B and 420—Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988—Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2)—Criminal Conspiracy, Cheating and Criminal Misconduct by Public Servant—Evidence and Proof—Acquittal—The case concerned allegations of criminal conspiracy, cheating, and criminal misconduct by public servants—The prosecution alleged that the accused persons entered into a conspiracy to obtain pecuniary advantage by abusing their official position and thereby caused wrongful loss to the concerned authority—The Court examined the essential ingredients of conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC and held that a mere meeting of minds or discussion is insufficient unless supported by clear evidence of an agreement to commit an illegal act—It was further observed that to establish an ...
(8) GAUHATI
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Section 173—Appeal Against Tribunal Award—Tribunal assessed claimant’s functional disability as 63% of the whole body based on a permanent right lower limb injury—Court noted tribunal erred in equating permanent limb disability with functional disability without justification, though claimant’s profession as a vegetable vendor could significantly affect earning capacity—No cross-objection filed; award unaltered—Appeals dismissed. [Para 24] B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Section 166—Assessment of Functional Disability—Following Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343, percentage of functional disability must be clarified by medical expert as relating to whole body or specific limb—Tribunal erred in treating limb disability as whole-body fun...
(9) ANDHRA PRADESH
Second appeal, Burden of Proof
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 100—Second Appeal—Substantial Question of Law—A second appeal is maintainable only when a substantial question of law arises which materially affects the rights of the parties—Mere reappreciation of facts or evidence does not constitute a substantial question of law, and the High Court should not interfere with concurrent findings of fact where two possible inferences may arise from the evidence. B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 100—Pleadings and New Contentions—Questions of law which require foundational facts cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal if such facts were not pleaded or proved before the courts below—Contentions not raised in pleadings or evidence before the trial court or the first appellate court are not permiss...
(10) TRIPURA
Bail, Recovery of money
A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985—Section 27-A—Financing Illicit Traffic—Offence of financing illicit traffic requires proof that the accused directly or indirectly provided funds to facilitate activities relating to illicit drug trafficking as defined under Section 2(viii-b) of the Act—Mere investment of one’s own money in a transaction does not automatically constitute “financing” under Section 27-A. [Paras 6–10] B. Recovery of Money—Drug Proceeds—Money recovered along with contraband cannot be presumed to be “drug money” or proceeds of narcotic trade unless the prosecution establishes a clear nexus showing that such funds were used to finance illicit trafficking. [Paras 11–16] C. Nature of Financing Activity—The expression &l...