(1) SUPREME COURT
Artificial Intelligence
A. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016—Section 7—Artificial Intelligence (AI)—Reliance on fake or hallucinated precedents—Effect—Held: Any judicial or adjudicatory decision founded upon non-existent, fake or AI-generated hallucinated precedents is no decision in the eyes of law and is liable to be set aside irrespective of whether such material had a direct or indirect bearing on the outcome. Courts and Tribunals must adopt a zero-tolerance approach towards citation or reliance on unverified AI-generated authorities in order to preserve the sanctity and integrity of the adjudicatory process. (Paras 1, 6–20) B. Artificial Intelligence—Judicial Process—Professional responsibility of Bar and Bench—Held: While Artificial Intelligence may be legitimately employed as an aid to legal rese...
(2) SUPREME COURT
Anticipatory bail
A. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023—Sections 108, 115(2), 351(2) & 352—Anticipatory Bail—Interim protection—Held: Where the petitioner, a woman with no criminal antecedents, sought anticipatory bail in a case alleging abetment of suicide and allied offences, and the charge-sheet had already been filed with no suicide note left by the deceased, the Supreme Court granted interim protection from arrest by directing that the petitioner shall not be arrested till further orders, pending consideration of the Special Leave Petition. (Paras 2–4) B. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023—Sections 108, 115(2), 351(2) & 352—Anticipatory Bail—Post charge-sheet stage—Held: Filing of the charge-sheet and the surrounding circumstances of the case, including the absence of a suicide note and the petiti...
(3) SUPREME COURT
POCSO
A. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023—Section 64(1)—Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012—Sections 3 & 4—Bail—Grant of bail in POCSO case—Held: While considering bail, the Court may take into account the overall facts and circumstances of the case, the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused, the stage of trial, and the likelihood of its early conclusion. Where the accused had remained in custody for about eight months and the trial was likely to take considerable time with several prosecution witnesses yet to be examined, bail was granted subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. (Paras 3, 5–6) B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012—Bail—Relevant considerations—Held: At the stage of considering bail, factors such as the ...
(4) SUPREME COURT
Quashing of proceeding
A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 465—Cognizance—Error in mentioning penal provision—Curable irregularity—Held: An erroneous reference to a penal provision while taking cognizance does not render the proceedings void where the court otherwise has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. Since cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender, such defect is a curable irregularity under Section 465 CrPC unless it occasions a failure of justice. (Paras 10–14) B. Gujarat Municipalities (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 1994 (as amended in 2005)—Rule 7A—Election Affidavit—Disclosure of Assets—Scope—Held: A candidate contesting municipal elections is under a mandatory obligation to disclose in the prescribed affidavit the assets of herself, her spouse and h...
(5) SUPREME COURT
Remission in sentence
A. Constitution of India—Article 161—Remission Policy—Applicability of beneficial policy—Held: A remission policy issued in exercise of the Governor's constitutional power under Article 161 cannot be overridden or superseded by a subsequent statutory remission policy framed under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The 2002 Haryana Remission Policy, though issued in the form of a Government memorandum, was traceable to Article 161 as it expressly contemplated orders of the Governor. Consequently, life convicts governed by the 2002 Policy are entitled to its benefits notwithstanding the subsequent 2008 statutory policy. (Paras 9–10, 12–13, 16–18) B. Constitution of India—Article 161—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Sections 432 & 433—Remi...
(6) SUPREME COURT
Income Tax
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Sections 166 & 168—Assessment of Income—Income Tax Returns—Self-employed deceased—Held: There can be no rigid or inflexible formula for determining the annual income of a deceased or injured claimant. While Income Tax Returns constitute an important statutory indicator of income, in the case of self-employed persons or those carrying on business, the average income reflected in the Income Tax Returns of up to the preceding three years should ordinarily be taken as the reference point. At the same time, the Court must also consider the nature of the business, its growth pattern, future earning potential, business fluctuations, losses in initial years and other surrounding circumstances to ensure award of just and fair compensation. (Paras 17–22) B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1...
(7) SUPREME COURT
Charge-sheet
A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 187(3)—Default Bail—Charge-sheet filed within statutory period—Non-filing of additional copies under Section 193(8)—Effect—Held: The right to default bail arises only when the charge-sheet itself is not filed within the prescribed period of sixty or ninety days. Once a police report complying with Section 193(3) BNSS is filed within time, the indefeasible right to default bail stands extinguished. Mere non-filing or delayed supply of additional copies of the charge-sheet or accompanying documents as contemplated under Section 193(8) or Section 230 BNSS does not vitiate the charge-sheet nor entitle the accused to statutory/default bail. (Paras 19–27) B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Sections 193(3), 193(8) & 230—Polic...
(8) SUPREME COURT
A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 209 and 244—Committal proceedings—Cases exclusively triable by Court of Session—Scope of Magistrate's powers—Held: In cases exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate performs only administrative and ministerial functions, namely, ensuring compliance with Sections 207 and 208 CrPC and committing the case under Section 209. Recording of pre-charge evidence under Section 244 CrPC is not contemplated or mandatory at the committal stage. (Paras 6, 9, 10, 12 and 13) B. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 207, 208 and 209—Committal proceedings—Legislative intent—Held: The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has substantially curtailed the role of the Magistrate at the stage of committal in comparison to the Code of 1898. The o...
(9) SUPREME COURT
Rejection of plaint, Suit for specific performance
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order VII Rule 11(d)—Rejection of plaint—Specific performance—Suit based on unregistered agreement to sell dated 21.08.1984 instituted after about thirty-eight years—Held: The suit was ex facie barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The period of limitation commences from the date fixed for performance or when the plaintiff first becomes entitled to sue. Clever drafting or artificial pleadings creating an illusion of a continuing cause of action cannot defeat the statutory bar of limitation. Rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC was justified. (Paras 15, 22 to 26) B. Limitation Act, 1963—Article 54—Suit for specific performance—Limitation—Held: A suit for specific performance must be instituted within three y...
(10) SUPREME COURT
Compromise, Decree
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order XXIII Rule 3—Compromise decree—Validity and requirements—Held: A lawful compromise under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC must be in writing, signed by the parties, and based on their free and voluntary consent. An advocate has no implied authority to enter into or consent to a compromise affecting the substantive rights of a party without specific authorization. A compromise decree obtained without complying with these mandatory requirements is unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside. (Paras 5 to 5.6) B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 151—Compromise decree obtained by fraud—Delay in seeking recall—Effect—Held: Where a compromise decree is alleged to have been obtained by fraud or without the consent of the affected party, mere delay in approach...
(1) KERALA
Territorial jurisdiction
A. Trade Marks Act, 1999—Sections 28(3), 34—Infringement between registered proprietors—Different classes—Prior user doctrine—Held, the bar under Section 28(3) applies only where both parties hold registrations in respect of the same goods or services—A defendant registered under Class 35 cannot claim immunity when dealing in gold jewellery falling under Class 14, in which the plaintiff holds registration—Prior user rights prevail over mere registration, and the plaintiff successfully established continuous commercial use and a superior claim to the composite mark—S. Syed Mohideen distinguished. (Paras 13, 16) B. Trade Marks Act, 1999—Sections 9, 32—Geographical expressions—Composite marks—Deceptive similarity—Held, a geographical expression like “Malab...
(2) KERALA
Service Law
A. Constitution of India, 1950—Article 227—Supervisory jurisdiction—Limited scope of interference—The High Court's power under Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate—Interference with orders of the Administrative Tribunal is permissible only in cases of patent perversity, manifest error, grave dereliction of duty, abuse of law, or violation of natural justice, and not merely because another view is possible. (Paras 6–11) B. Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985—Interim stay of transfer/promotion orders—Non-impleadment of affected employees—Violation of natural justice—Beneficiaries directly affected by a challenge to transfer or promotion orders are necessary parties—Grant of interim relief without impleading such persons or following the prescribed procedure viol...
(3) MEGHALAYA
Service Law
A. Service Law—Regularization of casual/temporary employees—Long and continuous service—Availability of sanctioned vacancies—Employees who have rendered continuous service for long periods and are performing perennial duties cannot be denied consideration for regularization merely on technical grounds—Where sanctioned vacancies exist, the employer must review the sanctioned strength and consider eligible employees for regularization in accordance with the applicable rules and qualification requirements. (Paras 10, 13, 14) B. Service Law—Regularization—Illegal and irregular appointments—Applicability of Umadevi—Though State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) prohibits regularization of appointments made dehors the rules, subsequent judicial pronouncements clarify that the decision cannot be...
(4) SIKKIM
Default bail
A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985—Section 36A—Exclusive jurisdiction of Special Court—Filing of charge-sheet before Chief Judicial Magistrate—Effect—Once a Special Court is constituted under the NDPS Act, it alone has exclusive jurisdiction to take cognizance of offences under the Act and conduct the trial—Filing of the charge-sheet before, and cognizance by, the Chief Judicial Magistrate lacking such jurisdiction is illegal and ineffective. (Paras 7, 11, 12, 14) B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 187(3)(ii)—Default bail—Charge-sheet filed before incompetent court—Right to default bail—Filing of a charge-sheet within sixty days before a court not empowered to take cognizance under the NDPS Act does not defeat the accused's indef...
(5) JHARKHAND
Service Law, Condonation of delay
A. Limitation—Condonation of Delay—Delay of 163 days in filing Letters Patent Appeal—Sufficient cause shown—Delay condoned—Where satisfactory reasons are furnished for delay in preferring a Letters Patent Appeal, the Court may exercise discretion to condone the delay in the interest of justice—Delay of 163 days was accordingly condoned. (Paras 1–4, I.A. No. 13819 of 2024). B. Service Law—Departmental Enquiry—Principles of Natural Justice—Non-supply of enquiry report and second show-cause notice before imposing major penalty—Violation of natural justice—Failure to furnish the enquiry report along with the second show-cause notice prior to imposition of a major penalty amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity and breach of natural justice—Though prejudice mu...
(6) ORISSA
Kidnapping
A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 374(2)—Appeal against conviction—Victim turning hostile—Conviction based solely on circumstantial and medical evidence—Where the prosecutrix, being the star witness, turns hostile and does not support the prosecution case, and there is no independent eyewitness or other reliable evidence establishing kidnapping or sexual assault, a conviction founded principally upon circumstantial and medical evidence cannot be sustained—In the absence of trustworthy evidence connecting the accused with the alleged offences under Sections 363, 366, and 376(2)(n) IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the conviction is liable to be set aside. (Paras 26, 33, 34) B. Penal Code, 1860—Sections 363 and 366—Kidnapping and abduction—Voluntary departure by victim&...
(7) CALCUTTA
Return of plaint
A. Commercial Courts Act, 2015—Section 2(1)(c)(vi)—Meaning of “commercial dispute”—Development agreements and infrastructure contracts—The expression “dispute arising out of” construction and infrastructure contracts is of wide amplitude and is not confined to pure construction contracts alone—A development agreement, whose essential character concerns construction and infrastructure development, does not cease to be a commercial contract merely because it additionally confers proprietary or developmental rights, including transfer of a portion of ownership rights, upon the developer—Consequently, suits seeking cancellation of such registered development agreements or connected powers of attorney constitute commercial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(vi) of the Act....
(8) MADHYA PRADESH
Service Law
A. Constitution of India, 1950—Article 226—Judicial review of disciplinary punishment—Effect of acquittal in criminal case—An acquittal in a criminal trial, particularly one based on the benefit of doubt, does not automatically exonerate a delinquent employee in departmental proceedings—Since the standard of proof in a departmental enquiry is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt, findings of guilt recorded in such proceedings are not rendered invalid merely because the employee has been acquitted by a criminal court—Consequently, a writ petition seeking quashing of a dismissal order solely on the basis of such acquittal is liable to be dismissed. (Paras 6, 8, 10) B. Service Law—Criminal proceedings and departmental enquiries—Distinct spheres and sta...
(9) BOMBAY
Family Settlement
A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Ss.9, 7 & 16—Composite Family Settlement—Arbitration Clause—Agreements executed contemporaneously as part of a single family settlement constitute an integrated transaction and cannot be construed in isolation—Prima facie, the arbitration clause contained in the parent settlement agreement governs disputes arising from interconnected agreements, warranting interim protection pending arbitral adjudication. B. Family Settlement—Construction of Contemporaneous Documents—Multiple documents forming part of a family business arrangement must be interpreted holistically—Trademark, branding, and territorial rights constituted an integral component of the family settlement and were not intended to exist independently of the overall framework. C. Tra...
(10) JHARKHAND
A. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—S.82—Powers of State Commissioner—The powers conferred upon the State Commissioner are confined to the matters expressly enumerated under Section 82—Although vested with certain powers of a Civil Court for purposes of inquiry and proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction to grant injunctions or adjudicate questions of title to immovable property, and cannot exercise powers beyond those specifically conferred by statute. [Paras 18-20] B. Land Disputes—Jurisdiction of Civil Courts—A pure dispute relating to ownership or title to land, having no nexus with disability rights, falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent Civil Court—Neither the State Disability Commissioner nor Revenue Authorit...