(1) SUPREME COURT
Mandatory injunction
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 100 read with Order XXI—Second Appeal—Mandatory Injunction—Held: In a second appeal, the High Court cannot set aside concurrent decrees granting mandatory injunction and substitute them with a direction for payment of monetary compensation in the absence of any such prayer by the plaintiff or consent of the legal representatives—Such an exercise travels beyond the scope of the decree and amounts to rewriting the relief granted by the courts below—The reversal of concurrent findings without justification results in miscarriage of justice. (Paras 5–6). B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 100—Substantial Question of Law—Scope of Interference—Held: Interference in a second appeal is permissible only upon formulation and determination o...
(2) SUPREME COURT
Compensation
A. Constitution of India, 1950—Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c), 19(1)(d) and 21—Right to Walk—Fundamental Right—Held: The right to walk safely on well-demarcated footpaths is an integral facet of the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 and the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution—Pedestrians are entitled to safe, accessible and obstruction-free footpaths, which must receive priority over motorised traffic—Correspondingly, urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities and panchayats are under a constitutional obligation to create, maintain and protect adequate pedestrian infrastructure to ensure the effective enjoyment of this fundamental right. (Paras 4, 9, 13, 20). B. Constitution of India, 1950—Article 21 read with Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Ri...
(3) SUPREME COURT
Amendment
A. Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957—Sections 59(d), 92 and 95(1)—Disciplinary Authority—Effect of 1993 Amendment—Held: By virtue of the amendment introduced by Act 67 of 1993 with effect from 01.10.1993, the Commissioner became the statutory disciplinary authority for all municipal officers and employees—The pre-existing Delhi Municipal Corporation Services (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959, insofar as they prescribed different disciplinary authorities, stood overridden to the extent of inconsistency—Such position continues unless fresh regulations are framed under Section 95(1) in conformity with the amended statutory scheme. (Paras 30, 63, 73–81). B. Statutory Interpretation—Amendment by Substitution—Prospective Operation—Held: A statutory provision substituted by ...
(4) SUPREME COURT
A. Constitution of India, 1950—Article 21—Right to life with dignity—Protection of differently-abled persons—State's obligation—Held: The right to life under Article 21 includes the right to live with dignity, particularly for persons with disabilities living in extreme poverty—The State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure availability of basic amenities and social support to such vulnerable persons—Accordingly, the State of Odisha was directed to provide all essential facilities to a visually impaired individual and his elderly mother and to file a status report regarding compliance. (Paras 4–9) B. Persons with Disabilities—Social welfare and rehabilitation—Legal aid and livelihood—Held: A visually impaired person is entitled not only to welfare benefits ...
(5) SUPREME COURT
A. Right to Information Act, 2005—Section 24(4)—Exemption of State Organisations from RTI Act—Validity of Notification—Held: Exemption under Section 24(4) is confined only to “intelligence and security organisations” established by the State Government—The Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (SPE), constituted for investigating corruption and specified criminal offences by public servants, cannot be treated as an intelligence or security organisation—Notification dated 25.08.2011 excluding the SPE from the purview of the RTI Act was held ultra vires Section 24(4) and struck down to that extent. (Paras 13–22). B. Right to Information Act, 2005—Sections 8(1)(h) and 24(4)—Information Relating to Sanction for Prosecution—Disclosure of Information—Held: In...
(6) SUPREME COURT
A. Recruitment to Public Service—Motor Vehicle Inspector Grade-II Recruitment, Tamil Nadu—Workshop Experience Certificates—Retrospective Approval of Workshops—Held: Candidates who had acquired the requisite workshop experience from Government-approved workshops could not be denied consideration merely because renewal of workshop approval was pending or subsequently granted with retrospective effect—Where re-verification conducted by the Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department established that candidates possessed more than one year of qualifying experience, their candidature was required to be considered for inclusion in the select list—Recruitment process directed to be completed expeditiously in view of the prolonged litigation. (Paras 10–13). B. Public Employment—Recruitment Process&mdas...
(7) SUPREME COURT
Election
A. Constitution of India, 1950—Article 329(b)—Election Matters—Rejection of Nomination Paper—Maintainability of Writ Petition—Held: The constitutional bar contained in Article 329(b) prohibits judicial interference in electoral matters during the course of an election—A challenge to the rejection of a nomination paper constitutes a challenge to the election process itself and can be raised only through an election petition after completion of the election—Neither Article 32 nor Article 226 can be invoked to question rejection of a nomination at an intermediate stage of the election. (Paras 6, 9–10, 12–13). B. Representation of the People Act, 1951—Section 33A—Disclosure of Criminal Cases in Affidavit—Rejection of Nomination—Held: The legality or correctness o...
(8) SUPREME COURT
Res Judicata
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 11 and Explanation IV—Constructive Res Judicata—Scope and Application—Held: The doctrine of constructive res judicata requires a party to raise in earlier proceedings all grounds which might and ought to have been raised—However, its application is not mechanical and must be tested in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of each case, particularly in disputes involving family members—Where the plaintiff’s rights already stood acknowledged and protected under a prior deed and were not in dispute, it could not be presumed that a stronger claim had been consciously abandoned so as to attract the bar of constructive res judicata—The contrary view taken by the High Court was unsustainable. (Paras 6, 8, 12–14). B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908&mda...
(9) SUPREME COURT
Enhancement of Compensation
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Sections 165 and 166—Liability for Accident Caused by Falling Tree Branch—Negligence of Municipal Authorities—Held: It is the duty of municipal and horticultural authorities to ensure proper maintenance, inspection and upkeep of roadside trees so as to prevent foreseeable harm to the public—Where a tree branch fell on a stationary autorickshaw during rainfall causing serious injuries to the victim, the authorities could not escape liability by merely invoking the doctrine of Act of God when preventive maintenance and risk management measures were found wanting—Compensation was therefore held payable to the victim. (Paras 9, 11, 15) B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Sections 165 and 166—Expression “Arising out of the Use of a Motor Vehicle”—Scope and...
(10) SUPREME COURT
Compensation
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Compensation for Death of Homemaker—Recognition of Homemakers as “Nation Builders”—Held: The contribution of a homemaker cannot be measured merely in economic terms or confined to notional income—Homemakers perform multifaceted functions involving household management, caregiving, emotional support and family welfare, making them indispensable contributors to society—Recognising such foundational contributions, the Court described homemakers as “Nation Builders” and held that compensation in motor accident claims must reflect both their economic and non-economic contributions to the family. (Paras 10, 13, 15, 20). B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Compensation—Death of Homemaker—Introduction of “Loss of Domestic Care” as Independen...
(1) JAMMU & KASHMIR
A. Penal Code, 1860—Sections 376 & 511—Attempt to Commit Rape—Where medical evidence does not establish penetration but proves sexual assault through injuries, ejaculation, and genital rubbing causing perineal laceration, conviction under Section 376 is unsustainable and is liable to be altered to one under Section 376 read with Section 511 for attempt to commit rape. (Paras 7, 40, 48, 59, 60) B. Penal Code, 1860—Section 376—Delay in Lodging FIR—Delay in reporting sexual offences, arising from social stigma, parental concern, and hesitation in approaching authorities, is not by itself fatal to the prosecution case and does not necessarily impair its credibility. (Paras 12, 17, 21, 24, 51, 53, 54) C. Penal Code, 1860—Section 376—Appreciation of Evidence—The prosecutrix's t...
(2) BOMBAY
A. Court Fees Act, 1859 (Bombay)—Section 46—Court Fee Exemption for Women—The exemption from payment of court fees available to women under the Government Notification dated 1-10-1994 is confined to specified categories, namely maintenance, matrimonial property disputes, violence, and divorce. Succession and partition suits do not qualify unless they fall within the notified categories. (Paras 10, 15, 18, 20–23) B. Court Fees Act, 1859 (Bombay)—Section 46—Violence—Scope of Exemption—The exemption on the ground of violence is attracted only where violence constitutes the foundation or an inseparable part of the cause of action. Mere allegations of physical, financial, or economic violence in a suit of a different nature are insufficient to claim exemption from court fees. (Paras 25–2...
(3) BOMBAY
A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Section 9—Post-Award Interim Relief—Grant of interim protection after an arbitral award requires the unsuccessful party to establish exceptional circumstances warranting departure from the award. Mere pendency of a challenge or an arguable case is insufficient; relief is justified only where refusal would cause irreparable prejudice despite a successful challenge. (Paras 42, 65) B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Sections 9 & 36(3)—Consent Terms—Suppression of Material Facts—Non-disclosure of material consent terms governing the continuation and expiry of a bank guarantee, coupled with delay in seeking relief, disentitles a party to equitable and discretionary relief under Section 9, particularly where such terms were negotiated by commercial...
(4) BOMBAY
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order VIII Rule 6A—Counter-Claim—A defendant may raise a counter-claim in respect of any right or claim accruing before or after institution of the suit, provided it arises before filing the written statement, with the object of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and enabling complete adjudication of disputes in a single suit. (Paras 23–26) B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order VIII Rule 6A—Belated Counter-Claim—No absolute time limit exists for filing a counter-claim before framing of issues. The Court may permit a delayed counter-claim after considering the explanation for delay, prejudice to the opposite party, stage of the proceedings, and the ends of justice. (Paras 19, 25, 30) C. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order VIII Rule 6A—Judicial Discretion...
(5) RAJASTHAN
A. Constitution of India—Article 21—Illegal Detention—Habeas Corpus—Compensation—Continued detention of a person despite suspension of sentence by the competent appellate authority constitutes a gross violation of personal liberty under Article 21. Public law compensation is warranted for the period of unlawful confinement, particularly where the authorities had knowledge of the suspension order but failed to secure the detenue's release. (Paras 1, 9, 13, 19, 24, 31, 38, 45, 50(i)) B. Administrative Law—Judicial Discipline—Compliance with Judicial Orders—Public authorities are bound to obey judicial and quasi-judicial orders unless stayed or set aside by a competent forum. Wilful non-compliance with an appellate order suspending sentence, resulting in illegal detention, amounts to gra...
(6) BOMBAY
Second appeal
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 100—Second Appeal—The jurisdiction of the High Court in a second appeal is confined to substantial questions of law arising from the judgment of the first appellate court. Findings of fact may be interfered with only where material evidence has been ignored, inadmissible evidence has been relied upon, or the findings are otherwise perverse. (Paras 10, 11, 13) B. Evidence Act, 1872—Sections 68, 72 & 90—Proof of Old Attested Documents—The presumption under Section 90 extends only to the genuineness of the execution of a document produced from proper custody after thirty years and does not prove its contents. Where attesting witnesses are alive and available, execution of an attested document must ordinarily be proved by examining them, and reliance on Section 9...
(8) BOMBAY
A. Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960—Sections 154B-24(1) & 73-ID—No-Confidence Motion—Two-Thirds Majority—A motion of no confidence against an office-bearer of a co-operative housing society must be carried by not less than two-thirds of the committee members present and entitled to vote at the meeting, the majority being reckoned with reference to members present and voting, and not the total committee strength. (Paras 15, 17, 19) B. Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960—Sections 154B-24(1) & 73-ID—Notice to Committee Members—Failure to issue notice of a no-confidence meeting to a duly appointed committee member, thereby depriving such member of the opportunity to participate and vote, vitiates the meeting and renders the resolution invalid. (Paras 7, 27, 29, 34) C...
(9) BOMBAY
Arbitral award
A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Section 34—Arbitral Award—Contractual Limitation of Damages—An arbitral tribunal does not exceed its jurisdiction by holding a contractual cap on damages inapplicable where the employer commits a fundamental breach of the contract. Such an interpretation, if reasonable and consistent with the commercial purpose of the agreement, does not amount to rewriting the contract and is not liable to interference under Section 34. (Paras 8, 14, 16, 24, 28, 33, 41) B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Section 28(3)—Interpretation of Contract—Under the amended Section 28(3), the arbitral tribunal is required to take into account the terms of the contract, enabling a commercially sensible interpretation that advances business efficacy and avoids absurd or unjus...
(10) KERALA
Dishonour of cheque
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Sections 138 and 139—Cheque Dishonour Proceedings—Simultaneous Civil and Criminal Remedies—Held: There is no legal bar to the simultaneous continuation of civil proceedings for recovery of money and criminal prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arising out of the same transaction—The statutory presumption under Section 139 regarding the existence of a legally enforceable debt is rebuttable and the accused must establish a probable defence during trial—At the pre-trial stage, the High Court ought not to quash proceedings under Section 138 by undertaking an adjudication of disputed questions of fact or evaluating the probable defence of the accused. (Paras 11, 13–18). B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Expedit...