(1) SUPREME COURT
A. Right to Information Act, 2005—Section 24(4)—Exemption of State Organisations from RTI Act—Validity of Notification—Held: Exemption under Section 24(4) is confined only to “intelligence and security organisations” established by the State Government—The Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (SPE), constituted for investigating corruption and specified criminal offences by public servants, cannot be treated as an intelligence or security organisation—Notification dated 25.08.2011 excluding the SPE from the purview of the RTI Act was held ultra vires Section 24(4) and struck down to that extent. (Paras 13–22). B. Right to Information Act, 2005—Sections 8(1)(h) and 24(4)—Information Relating to Sanction for Prosecution—Disclosure of Information—Held: In...
(2) SUPREME COURT
A. Recruitment to Public Service—Motor Vehicle Inspector Grade-II Recruitment, Tamil Nadu—Workshop Experience Certificates—Retrospective Approval of Workshops—Held: Candidates who had acquired the requisite workshop experience from Government-approved workshops could not be denied consideration merely because renewal of workshop approval was pending or subsequently granted with retrospective effect—Where re-verification conducted by the Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department established that candidates possessed more than one year of qualifying experience, their candidature was required to be considered for inclusion in the select list—Recruitment process directed to be completed expeditiously in view of the prolonged litigation. (Paras 10–13). B. Public Employment—Recruitment Process&mdas...
(3) SUPREME COURT
Election
A. Constitution of India, 1950—Article 329(b)—Election Matters—Rejection of Nomination Paper—Maintainability of Writ Petition—Held: The constitutional bar contained in Article 329(b) prohibits judicial interference in electoral matters during the course of an election—A challenge to the rejection of a nomination paper constitutes a challenge to the election process itself and can be raised only through an election petition after completion of the election—Neither Article 32 nor Article 226 can be invoked to question rejection of a nomination at an intermediate stage of the election. (Paras 6, 9–10, 12–13). B. Representation of the People Act, 1951—Section 33A—Disclosure of Criminal Cases in Affidavit—Rejection of Nomination—Held: The legality or correctness o...
(4) SUPREME COURT
Res Judicata
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 11 and Explanation IV—Constructive Res Judicata—Scope and Application—Held: The doctrine of constructive res judicata requires a party to raise in earlier proceedings all grounds which might and ought to have been raised—However, its application is not mechanical and must be tested in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of each case, particularly in disputes involving family members—Where the plaintiff’s rights already stood acknowledged and protected under a prior deed and were not in dispute, it could not be presumed that a stronger claim had been consciously abandoned so as to attract the bar of constructive res judicata—The contrary view taken by the High Court was unsustainable. (Paras 6, 8, 12–14). B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908&mda...
(5) SUPREME COURT
Enhancement of Compensation
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Sections 165 and 166—Liability for Accident Caused by Falling Tree Branch—Negligence of Municipal Authorities—Held: It is the duty of municipal and horticultural authorities to ensure proper maintenance, inspection and upkeep of roadside trees so as to prevent foreseeable harm to the public—Where a tree branch fell on a stationary autorickshaw during rainfall causing serious injuries to the victim, the authorities could not escape liability by merely invoking the doctrine of Act of God when preventive maintenance and risk management measures were found wanting—Compensation was therefore held payable to the victim. (Paras 9, 11, 15) B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Sections 165 and 166—Expression “Arising out of the Use of a Motor Vehicle”—Scope and...
(6) SUPREME COURT
Compensation
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Compensation for Death of Homemaker—Recognition of Homemakers as “Nation Builders”—Held: The contribution of a homemaker cannot be measured merely in economic terms or confined to notional income—Homemakers perform multifaceted functions involving household management, caregiving, emotional support and family welfare, making them indispensable contributors to society—Recognising such foundational contributions, the Court described homemakers as “Nation Builders” and held that compensation in motor accident claims must reflect both their economic and non-economic contributions to the family. (Paras 10, 13, 15, 20). B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Compensation—Death of Homemaker—Introduction of “Loss of Domestic Care” as Independen...
(7) SUPREME COURT
A. Haryana Cooperative Societies Act, 1984—Section 36; Primary Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Societies Ltd. Staff Service Rules, 2003—Rule 3—Recruitment Process—Role of Non-Elected Official Members in Board of Directors—Held: Though Rule 3 mandates the presence of the Assistant Registrar, Inspector Cooperative Societies and District Manager (HAFED) in the decision-making process relating to appointments, their role is essentially supervisory and advisory in nature—Absence of such officials at the stage when the Board of Directors considered and approved appointments does not, by itself, render the entire recruitment process void where the earlier stages of recruitment were conducted in accordance with law—The defect is curable and confined to the final stage of decision-making. (Paras 55&nd...
(8) SUPREME COURT
A. Haryana Civil Services (Compassionate Financial Assistance or Appointment) Rules, 2019—Rule 23(1)—Compassionate Appointment vis-à-vis Compassionate Financial Assistance—Held: Rule 23(1), which contemplates suspension or deferment of compassionate financial assistance during the pendency of criminal proceedings, applies exclusively to claims for financial assistance and has no application to claims for compassionate appointment—Invocation of Rule 23(1) to defer or reject a claim for compassionate appointment is legally unsustainable—High Court erred in applying Rule 23(1) beyond its statutory scope. (Paras 23–26). B. Haryana Civil Services (Compassionate Financial Assistance or Appointment) Rules, 2019—Rule 5(1)(f) and Rule 5(1)(g)—Compassionate Appointment—Eligibility of C...
(9) SUPREME COURT
A. Disciplinary Proceedings—Competency of Disciplinary Authority—Dismissal from Service—Held: An employee can be dismissed by an authority competent under the applicable service regulations even if such authority is not the appointing authority—Where the MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations specifically empowered officers of the rank of Executive Engineer and above to impose the penalty of dismissal upon Pay Grade-III employees, the order of dismissal passed by the Executive Engineer was valid and within jurisdiction—Protection under Article 311 of the Constitution was unavailable as the employee did not hold a civil post under the Union or the State. (Paras 30–37) B. Disciplinary Proceedings—Defective Domestic Inquiry—De Novo Adjudication Before Labour Court—Fresh Show-Cause Notice...
(10) SUPREME COURT
A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act)—Sections 24, 33(5), 36 and 39; Family Courts Act, 1984—Section 12—Child Custody and Visitation Rights—Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse by Parent—Held: Welfare, dignity, emotional security and psychological well-being of the child are paramount considerations in custody and visitation disputes—Courts must adopt a child-centric and trauma-informed approach and avoid repeated psychological evaluations or adversarial processes that may result in re-traumatisation and secondary victimisation—Where psychological assessment is considered necessary, it should ordinarily be undertaken by an independent and neutral expert following principles of minimum intrusion, child-friendly procedure and institutional neutrality. (Paras 30–80, ...
(1) KERALA
Maintenance
A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Proof of Marriage—Declaration of Marital Status—Burden of Proof—Held: A person seeking a declaration of status as the legally wedded spouse bears the burden of establishing the factum of marriage on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities—Mere production of documents describing a person as husband or father is insufficient where the alleged marriage itself is specifically denied and the essential ceremonies and customary rites constituting a valid marriage are neither properly pleaded nor proved—In the absence of satisfactory proof of a valid marriage, the claim for declaration of marital status is liable to be rejected. (Paras 8–9) B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Section 125—Maintenance—Existence of Marital Relationship—Held: Ent...
(2) HIMACHAL PRADESH
Acquittal, Compounding of offence
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Sections 138 and 147—Compounding of Offence After Conviction—Held: An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be compounded at any stage of the proceedings, including after conviction by the trial court and affirmation thereof in appeal—Where the parties have amicably settled the dispute and the complainant has received the entire cheque amount or compensation agreed upon, the Court may exercise its power under Section 147 to compound the offence, set aside the judgments of conviction and sentence, and acquit the accused. (Paras 5–9). B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 147—Compromise Between Parties—Litigation Costs and Compounding Fee—Held: While permitting compounding of an offence under Section 138 of the Act on...
(3) PUNJAB & HARYANA
A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985—Sections 21(c), 27-A, 29 and 37—Bail in Commercial Quantity Cases—Prolonged Incarceration and Delay in Trial—Held: Though the rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act ordinarily govern grant of bail in cases involving commercial quantity, prolonged incarceration and undue delay in conclusion of trial constitute significant factors warranting relaxation of the statutory embargo—Where the accused had remained in custody for more than one year, investigation stood completed, no prosecution witness had been examined and the trial was not likely to conclude in the near future, continued detention would infringe the fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution—Bail was therefore granted. (Paras 9–17, 20–22). B. Constitution...
(4) HIMACHAL PRADESH
Statutory notice
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Statutory Notice—Limitation—Cause of Action—Held: Service of a demand notice within the prescribed period from the date of receipt of information regarding dishonour of the cheque is a mandatory condition precedent for prosecution under Section 138—Where the complainant's own evidence established that the cheque was dishonoured and the return memo was received on 03.01.2018, but the statutory notice was issued only on 27.03.2018, beyond the prescribed period, no valid cause of action arose under Section 138—Acquittal of the accused was therefore justified. (Paras 12–18). B. Criminal Appeal Against Acquittal—Scope of Interference—Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Held: An appellate court should not inter...
(5) HIMACHAL PRADESH
Presumption
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Sections 118(a), 138 and 139—Presumption of Legally Enforceable Debt—Rebuttal of Presumption—Held: Once the accused admits issuance of the cheque and his signatures thereon, statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 arise that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability—The burden then shifts upon the accused to rebut such presumption by raising a probable defence through cogent evidence—A mere plea that the cheque was issued as a blank security cheque, unsupported by reliable evidence, is insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption—Conviction under Section 138 was rightly upheld where the accused failed to establish repayment of the loan or otherwise dislodge the presumption. (Paras 18&ndash...
(6) DELHI
Eviction
A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005—Sections 2(s) and 17—Shared Household—Right of Residence of Daughter-in-Law—Held: A daughter-in-law cannot claim an indefeasible right of residence in the self-acquired property of her mother-in-law merely by virtue of marriage—Where the property was purchased by the mother-in-law long after the marriage, she never resided therein with the daughter-in-law, and the premises were occupied only by permission granted to the son and his family, the property does not constitute a “shared household” within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Act—The daughter-in-law's right of residence is enforceable primarily against her husband and not against the self-acquired property of the mother-in-law. (Paras 34, 38–40, 43). B. Property L...
(8) DELHI
Mutual Consent
A. Special Marriage Act, 1954—Sections 28 and 29—Mutual Consent Divorce—Waiver of Statutory Waiting Period—Held: The statutory bar against presentation of a divorce petition within one year of marriage under Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act is not absolute and may be waived in exceptional circumstances—Where the marriage remained purely notional, with no cohabitation, no consummation, no social or familial acceptance and both parties mutually sought dissolution, insistence on the statutory waiting period would serve no meaningful purpose and would only prolong hardship—The Court is empowered to exercise its discretion to waive the one-year period and permit the petition for divorce by mutual consent to be entertained. (Paras 16–20). B. Special Marriage Act, 1954—Section 29—Exc...
(9) DELHI
Void marriage
A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Sections 5(i) and 11—Void Marriage—Prior Subsisting Marriage—Customary Divorce—Held: A marriage solemnized during the subsistence of an earlier valid marriage is void ab initio under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act—A plea of dissolution of the earlier marriage by custom can succeed only upon strict proof of a valid custom having the force of law—The burden of proving such custom lies upon the party asserting it and the custom must be shown to be ancient, certain, reasonable and continuously observed—Mere knowledge of the respondent regarding the appellant's previous marriage does not validate a marriage otherwise void in law. (Paras 4, 6, 13–18, 22). B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Sections 24 and 25—Maintenance Pendente Lite and Permanen...
(10) ALLAHABAD
Rejection of plaint
A. Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021—Sections 1(3), 4, 9 and 38(1)—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Maintainability of SCC Suit—Held: Where the plaint itself admits the applicability of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 to the premises in question, acknowledges the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, and invokes Sections 4 and 9 of the Act for enforcement of tenancy obligations and recovery of enhanced rent, the dispute is governed exclusively by the statutory mechanism under the Act. In view of the express bar contained in Section 38(1), the jurisdiction of the civil court, including the SCC Court, stands excluded and the plaint is liable to be rejected as barred by law. (Paras 14–18). B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—Order VII Rule 11&md...
