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(1) SUPREME COURT
Charge-sheet

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 187(3)—Default Bail—Charge-sheet filed within statutory period—Non-filing of additional copies under Section 193(8)—Effect—Held: The right to default bail arises only when the charge-sheet itself is not filed within the prescribed period of sixty or ninety days. Once a police report complying with Section 193(3) BNSS is filed within time, the indefeasible right to default bail stands extinguished. Mere non-filing or delayed supply of additional copies of the charge-sheet or accompanying documents as contemplated under Section 193(8) or Section 230 BNSS does not vitiate the charge-sheet nor entitle the accused to statutory/default bail. (Paras 19–27) B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Sections 193(3), 193(8) & 230—Polic...

Appeal allowed
(2) SUPREME COURT

A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 209 and 244—Committal proceedings—Cases exclusively triable by Court of Session—Scope of Magistrate's powers—Held: In cases exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate performs only administrative and ministerial functions, namely, ensuring compliance with Sections 207 and 208 CrPC and committing the case under Section 209. Recording of pre-charge evidence under Section 244 CrPC is not contemplated or mandatory at the committal stage. (Paras 6, 9, 10, 12 and 13) B. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Sections 207, 208 and 209—Committal proceedings—Legislative intent—Held: The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has substantially curtailed the role of the Magistrate at the stage of committal in comparison to the Code of 1898. The o...

Appeal allowed
(3) SUPREME COURT
Rejection of plaint, Suit for specific performance

A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order VII Rule 11(d)—Rejection of plaint—Specific performance—Suit based on unregistered agreement to sell dated 21.08.1984 instituted after about thirty-eight years—Held: The suit was ex facie barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The period of limitation commences from the date fixed for performance or when the plaintiff first becomes entitled to sue. Clever drafting or artificial pleadings creating an illusion of a continuing cause of action cannot defeat the statutory bar of limitation. Rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC was justified. (Paras 15, 22 to 26) B. Limitation Act, 1963—Article 54—Suit for specific performance—Limitation—Held: A suit for specific performance must be instituted within three y...

(4) SUPREME COURT
Compromise, Decree

A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order XXIII Rule 3—Compromise decree—Validity and requirements—Held: A lawful compromise under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC must be in writing, signed by the parties, and based on their free and voluntary consent. An advocate has no implied authority to enter into or consent to a compromise affecting the substantive rights of a party without specific authorization. A compromise decree obtained without complying with these mandatory requirements is unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside. (Paras 5 to 5.6) B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 151—Compromise decree obtained by fraud—Delay in seeking recall—Effect—Held: Where a compromise decree is alleged to have been obtained by fraud or without the consent of the affected party, mere delay in approach...

(5) SUPREME COURT

A. Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014—Regulation of street vending—Implementation of statutory scheme—Held: Supreme Court issued comprehensive directions for effective implementation of the Street Vendors Act by directing relocation of licensed street vendors to duly identified and operational vending zones equipped with basic public amenities, issuance of smart identity cards, installation of CCTV cameras, establishment of helpline facilities for vendors and consumers, and expeditious disposal of all pending applications and appeals within prescribed timelines to ensure protection of vendors' livelihood while maintaining public order. (Paras 6 to 8) B. Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014—Essential Service Prov...

(6) SUPREME COURT
Anticipatory bail

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023—Sections 69 & 3(5)—Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961—Sections 3 & 4—Anticipatory Bail—Interim Protection—Held: Pending consideration of the anticipatory bail petition arising out of offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Supreme Court granted interim protection directing that, in the event of arrest, the petitioner be released on anticipatory bail subject to the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer—The petitioner was further directed to cooperate with the investigation, while notice was issued for final adjudication. (Paras 2 to 4) ...

(7) SUPREME COURT
Anticipatory bail

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023—Sections 61(2), 318(4), 338, 336(3) & 340(2)—Anticipatory Bail—Interim Protection—Held: Pending consideration of the Special Leave Petition, the Supreme Court granted interim anticipatory bail by directing that, in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be released on bail subject to the satisfaction of the concerned Investigating Officer in connection with the registered FIR—The petitioner was further directed to cooperate with the investigation, while notice was issued and the matter was listed for further hearing. (Paras 2 to 4) ...

(8) SUPREME COURT
Arbitration, Interim relief

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Arbitration Proceedings—Interim Relief—Challenge to Arbitrator—Held: Pending consideration of the Special Leave Petition, the Supreme Court permitted the arbitral proceedings to continue but restrained the Arbitrator from pronouncing, serving or uploading the final arbitral award until further orders—The Court also stayed the operation of the High Court's direction requiring the Arbitrator to refund the arbitral fee, while clarifying that the respondent's cross-Special Leave Petition would be considered separately. (Paras 2 to 5) ...

(9) SUPREME COURT
Compensation

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Insurer's Liability—Recovery Rights—Fitness Certificate—Interim Order—Held: Pending consideration of the legal issue regarding the insurer's right to recover compensation from the vehicle owner where the offending vehicle allegedly lacked a valid fitness certificate on the date of the accident, the Supreme Court directed the insurer to unconditionally satisfy the award by paying the entire compensation with accrued interest to the claimants—The question whether absence of a fitness certificate entitles the insurer to recover the amount from the owner, in view of the alleged conflict of judicial opinion, was kept open for final adjudication. (Paras 3 & 4) ...

(10) SUPREME COURT

A. Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960—Section 27(3A)—Election to Co-operative Society—Eligibility of individual shareholder-members to vote—Dispute regarding completion of membership—Held: Where the dispute regarding inclusion of individual shareholder-members in the voters' list turned on the date of completion of membership and deposit of the requisite admission/share amount, involving disputed questions of fact requiring examination of documentary evidence, the Supreme Court declined to grant interim relief and directed that the election process should continue, subject to the final outcome of the Special Leave Petitions. (Paras 2 to 5) B. Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960—Section 27(3A)—Election process—Interim relief—Held: Mere pendency of challenge to ...

(1) BOMBAY
Family Settlement

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Ss.9, 7 & 16—Composite Family Settlement—Arbitration Clause—Agreements executed contemporaneously as part of a single family settlement constitute an integrated transaction and cannot be construed in isolation—Prima facie, the arbitration clause contained in the parent settlement agreement governs disputes arising from interconnected agreements, warranting interim protection pending arbitral adjudication. B. Family Settlement—Construction of Contemporaneous Documents—Multiple documents forming part of a family business arrangement must be interpreted holistically—Trademark, branding, and territorial rights constituted an integral component of the family settlement and were not intended to exist independently of the overall framework. C. Tra...

(2) JHARKHAND

A. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—S.82—Powers of State Commissioner—The powers conferred upon the State Commissioner are confined to the matters expressly enumerated under Section 82—Although vested with certain powers of a Civil Court for purposes of inquiry and proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction to grant injunctions or adjudicate questions of title to immovable property, and cannot exercise powers beyond those specifically conferred by statute. [Paras 18-20] B. Land Disputes—Jurisdiction of Civil Courts—A pure dispute relating to ownership or title to land, having no nexus with disability rights, falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent Civil Court—Neither the State Disability Commissioner nor Revenue Authorit...

Disposed of
(3) JHARKHAND

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—S.430(1)—Suspension of Sentence After Conviction—At the post-conviction stage, the presumption of innocence no longer operates, there being a judicial finding of guilt—Suspension of sentence requires strong and compelling reasons, and the Court is concerned only with the prima facie merits of the appeal without undertaking a detailed reappreciation of evidence. [Para 12] B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—S.430(1)—Custody Period—Gravity of Offence—Mere long incarceration, even exceeding six years, is not by itself a sufficient ground for suspension of sentence in cases involving grave offences punishable with life imprisonment—The nature and seriousness of the offence, supported by credible eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence,...

(4) KERALA
Writ jurisdiction

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—S.29(2)—Customary Dissolution of Marriage—Family Pension—A marriage validly dissolved through a registered customary agreement in accordance with the long-standing practices of the Thiyya community of North Malabar, recognized under Section 6 of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1932 and saved by Section 29(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, stands effectively dissolved from the date of such agreement—A subsequent decree of divorce obtained only to satisfy departmental requirements does not alter the actual date of dissolution for determining entitlement to family pension. [Paras 17-19] B. Pleadings—Statutory Relief Not Expressly Invoked—Relief founded on a statutory right may be granted even in the absence of a specific reference to the enabling provision, provided the mat...

(5) MEGHALAYA
Circumstantial evidence

A. Evidence Act, 1872—Circumstantial Evidence—Standard of Proof—In a case founded solely on circumstantial evidence, each incriminating circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and must form a complete chain leading only to the guilt of the accused, excluding every other reasonable hypothesis—Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal proof, there being a clear distinction between what “may be true” and what “must be true.” [Paras 10, 36] B. Last Seen Theory and Abscondence—Evidentiary Value—The circumstance of a prior quarrel or last-seen-together, in the absence of corroborative evidence, raises only suspicion and is insufficient to establish guilt—Likewise, alleged abscondence loses significance where the accused was on sanctioned leave, suff...

(6) KARNATAKA

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Ss.34 & 37—Scope of Judicial Interference—A Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 does not act as an appellate forum and cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view for that of the Arbitrator—Patent illegality must strike at the root of the award and does not include mere erroneous application of law or reassessment of evidence—The scope under Section 37 is even narrower and is confined to examining whether the Section 34 Court acted within the statutory limits. [Paras 3-6] B. Limitation Act, 1963—Art.54—Specific Performance—No Fixed Date for Performance—Where an agreement does not prescribe a specific date for execution of sale deeds, limitation commences only upon a clear and unequivocal refusal to perform the cont...

Appeal dismissed
(7) DELHI

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—S.528—Cancellation of Bail—Scope of Interference—Though superior courts ordinarily refrain from interfering with orders granting bail, such interference is warranted where the Trial Court has ignored vital considerations in a serious offence—In exercise of inherent jurisdiction, the High Court may set aside a bail order that is manifestly unsustainable. [Para 34] B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012—Bail—Relevant Considerations—While considering bail under the POCSO Act, courts must keep in view the protective object of the statute and assess the prima facie case, gravity of allegations, severity of punishment, possibility of influencing witnesses, age and vulnerability of the child victim, and the age difference between the ...

Disposed of
(8) DELHI
Joint family property, Hindu Law

A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—S.100—Regular Second Appeal—Scope of Interference—Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, based on proper appreciation of evidence, cannot be interfered with in a Second Appeal unless a substantial question of law arises—A challenge directed solely against factual findings is not maintainable under Section 100 CPC. [Paras 41, 53] B. Pleadings—Necessity of Foundation for Relief—No relief or finding can be granted in the absence of requisite pleadings, and evidence adduced without a corresponding plea cannot be considered—A plea that property was purchased from joint family funds must specifically plead the existence of a joint family nucleus and source of funds, failing which the defence is liable to be rejected. ...

(9) DELHI

A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—S.100—Regular Second Appeal—Interference with Findings of Fact—Where the Trial Court has comprehensively appreciated the evidence and recorded cogent findings based on documentary material and admissions, the First Appellate Court cannot reverse such findings without an independent and complete reappraisal of the evidence—Reversal of a plausible view taken by the Trial Court, ignoring overwhelming documentary evidence and admissions of co-defendants, is perverse and unsustainable. [Paras 91-92, 109-111] B. Registration Act, 1908—Ss.17(1)(b), 17(2) & 49—Family Settlement—Memorandum of Past Oral Partition—A family arrangement may validly be effected orally, and a subsequent writing merely recording a concluded oral settlement does not require compulso...

(10) KARNATAKA
Prevention of Corruption

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018)—Section 7(a)—Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 483—Regular Bail—Bribe demand by police officials—Held: Even assuming a prima facie case regarding demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the alleged offence is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and is neither punishable with death nor imprisonment for life—After arrest, seizure of the tainted amount and recording of relevant material, the accused were remanded to judicial custody, indicating that custodial interrogation was no longer necessary—In the absence of criminal antecedents and where apprehensions of witness tampering could be addressed through stringent conditions, the accused were entitled to be released on bail. (Paras 6 to 10) B. Preve...

Bail Granted
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