(1) SUPREME COURT
Territorial jurisdiction
A. Constitution of India, 1950—Article 226(1) and (2)—Territorial Jurisdiction of High Court—Service Matters Relating to CAPF/BSF Personnel—Held: Even where the cause of action for dismissal from service arises outside Delhi, the Delhi High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) if the Union of India and the Director General of the concerned Central Armed Police Force, whose offices are situated in Delhi, are impleaded as respondents—The situs of such authorities is sufficient to confer jurisdiction notwithstanding that the impugned order was passed elsewhere. (Paras 21, 27, 34). B. Constitution of India, 1950—Article 226—Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens—Applicability in Writ Jurisdiction—Held: The doctrine of forum non conveniens, though applicable where mult...
(2) SUPREME COURT
Contempt of Court
A. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 Sections 2 and 12—Breach of Undertaking Given to Court—Use of Elephant in Temple/Commercial Activities Despite Restraint Order—Held: An undertaking given to the Court has the same sanctity as a judicial order and must be strictly complied with—Where a party, despite undertaking that the elephant in question would not be used for commercial or temple activities, admittedly permitted its participation in a temple ritual and procession, such conduct amounted to wilful disobedience of the undertaking and constituted civil contempt—Respondent held guilty of contempt and directed to pay fine. (Paras 12–19). B. Wildlife Protection and Animal Welfare—Interim Custody of Elephant Pending Adjudication—Welfare of Animal Paramount—Held: In a dispute regarding inte...
(3) SUPREME COURT
Auction sale
A. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002—Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002—Rule 9(3), (4) and (5)—Auction Sale of Secured Asset—Mandatory Compliance with Payment Schedule—Held: Rule 9 of the SARFAESI Rules mandates that the auction purchaser must deposit 25% of the sale price immediately upon sale and pay the balance 75% within fifteen days, unless an extension is mutually agreed upon in writing between the secured creditor, borrower and auction purchaser—In the absence of any written agreement extending time, payment of the balance sale consideration beyond the statutory period renders the auction sale invalid—Non-compliance with Rule 9 goes to the root of the sale and vitiates the entire auction process. (Paras 24–34,...
(4) SUPREME COURT
A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Section 392—Reference to Third Judge on Difference of Opinion—Scope of Jurisdiction—Held: Where Judges of a Division Bench hearing a criminal appeal differ in opinion, the reference under Section 392 CrPC is confined to the specific appeal or part of the appeal in respect of which such difference has arisen—In a composite appeal by multiple accused, unanimous findings recorded by both Judges regarding certain appellants attain finality and do not automatically stand reopened merely because a difference of opinion exists in relation to another appellant—The correctness of the contrary view expressed in Sajjan Singh v. State of M.P., (1999) 1 SCC 315, having far-reaching implications on the scope of a third Judge’s jurisdiction, was referred for consideration by a...
(5) SUPREME COURT
Bail, Murder
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 439—Bail—Murder Case—Prolonged Pendency of Proceedings—Held: Where the incident had occurred about 43 years prior and the accused had remained on bail throughout the trial except for a brief period of about three months as an undertrial prisoner, continued incarceration pending further proceedings was not justified—Considering the extraordinary lapse of time and the conduct of the accused during the course of trial, the Court directed release of the petitioner on bail in connection with the offence under Section 302 IPC, subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court. (Paras 1–8) ...
(6) SUPREME COURT
Commercial transaction
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Dishonour of Cheque—Legally Enforceable Debt or Liability—Held: To sustain a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the cheque must have been issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt or other liability—Where the transaction arose out of an agreement for purchase of a business concern and subsequent events demonstrated that the business had failed, the leased premises had been surrendered and the accused had derived no enduring benefit from the transaction, the continuation of criminal liability under the peculiar facts of the case was found unjustified—Accordingly, the conviction and sentence were set aside. (Paras 4–5). B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Commercial Transaction—...
(7) SUPREME COURT
Investigation
A. Constitution of India—Article 21—Right to Speedy Investigation and Trial—Held: The right to speedy investigation and trial is an integral facet of Article 21 of the Constitution and extends not only to the accused but also to the victim and society at large—Timely completion of investigation is an indispensable component of fair criminal procedure and investigations cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely without reasonable justification—Where an investigation remains inconclusive for an inordinate period, constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene and ensure that the criminal process reaches a logical conclusion. (Paras 10–13, 18). B. Criminal Procedure—Prolonged Investigation—Judicial Intervention—Held: Where a criminal complaint remains under investigation for near...
(8) SUPREME COURT
A. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957—Section 9—Royalty on Minerals—Effect of Subsequent Statutory Enhancement—Held: Royalty is a statutory levy payable at the rate specified in the Second Schedule to the MMDR Act and is linked to the removal or consumption of minerals from the leased area—A contractual arrangement or tender condition cannot freeze the rate of royalty prevailing on the date of auction or acceptance of bid where, prior to dispatch of the mineral, the rate stands enhanced by a statutory amendment—A contractual provision must yield to a subsequent statutory change and the purchaser is liable to pay royalty at the enhanced rate applicable on the date of removal of the mineral. (Paras 11–13). B. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957—S...
(9) SUPREME COURT
Criminal proceedings
A. Constitution of India—Article 21—Right to Travel Abroad vis-à-vis Right to Speedy Trial—Held: Though the right to travel abroad forms an integral part of personal liberty under Article 21, such right is not absolute and must be balanced against the right of the victim to a speedy trial and the larger societal interest in the effective administration of criminal justice—Where an accused has been involved in prolonged criminal proceedings and his conduct raises concerns regarding evasion of the judicial process, reasonable restrictions on foreign travel may be justified—A balance must be struck between individual liberty and the interests of justice. (Paras 10, 13, 14). B. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 442—Revisional Jurisdiction—Permission to Travel Abroad&mdas...
(10) SUPREME COURT
Summoning additional accused
A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 319—Summoning Additional Accused—Scope and Standard of Proof—Held: The power under Section 319 CrPC is extraordinary and discretionary and is to be exercised sparingly only where strong and cogent evidence emerges during trial indicating involvement of a person not arraigned as an accused—The standard required is higher than that applicable at the stage of framing of charge and must disclose more than a mere prima facie case, though short of evidence sufficient for conviction—Where such threshold is not satisfied, summoning of an additional accused is impermissible. (Paras 13, 25). B. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 319—Reliability of Subsequent Material—Delayed Recovery of Memory Card—Held: Where incriminating material allegedly ...
(1) HIMACHAL PRADESH
Acquittal, Compounding of offence
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Sections 138 and 147—Compounding of Offence After Conviction—Held: An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be compounded at any stage of the proceedings, including after conviction by the trial court and affirmation thereof in appeal—Where the parties have amicably settled the dispute and the complainant has received the entire cheque amount or compensation agreed upon, the Court may exercise its power under Section 147 to compound the offence, set aside the judgments of conviction and sentence, and acquit the accused. (Paras 5–9). B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 147—Compromise Between Parties—Litigation Costs and Compounding Fee—Held: While permitting compounding of an offence under Section 138 of the Act on...
(2) PUNJAB & HARYANA
A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985—Sections 21(c), 27-A, 29 and 37—Bail in Commercial Quantity Cases—Prolonged Incarceration and Delay in Trial—Held: Though the rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act ordinarily govern grant of bail in cases involving commercial quantity, prolonged incarceration and undue delay in conclusion of trial constitute significant factors warranting relaxation of the statutory embargo—Where the accused had remained in custody for more than one year, investigation stood completed, no prosecution witness had been examined and the trial was not likely to conclude in the near future, continued detention would infringe the fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution—Bail was therefore granted. (Paras 9–17, 20–22). B. Constitution...
(3) HIMACHAL PRADESH
Statutory notice
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Statutory Notice—Limitation—Cause of Action—Held: Service of a demand notice within the prescribed period from the date of receipt of information regarding dishonour of the cheque is a mandatory condition precedent for prosecution under Section 138—Where the complainant's own evidence established that the cheque was dishonoured and the return memo was received on 03.01.2018, but the statutory notice was issued only on 27.03.2018, beyond the prescribed period, no valid cause of action arose under Section 138—Acquittal of the accused was therefore justified. (Paras 12–18). B. Criminal Appeal Against Acquittal—Scope of Interference—Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Held: An appellate court should not inter...
(4) HIMACHAL PRADESH
Presumption
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Sections 118(a), 138 and 139—Presumption of Legally Enforceable Debt—Rebuttal of Presumption—Held: Once the accused admits issuance of the cheque and his signatures thereon, statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 arise that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability—The burden then shifts upon the accused to rebut such presumption by raising a probable defence through cogent evidence—A mere plea that the cheque was issued as a blank security cheque, unsupported by reliable evidence, is insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption—Conviction under Section 138 was rightly upheld where the accused failed to establish repayment of the loan or otherwise dislodge the presumption. (Paras 18&ndash...
(5) DELHI
Eviction
A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005—Sections 2(s) and 17—Shared Household—Right of Residence of Daughter-in-Law—Held: A daughter-in-law cannot claim an indefeasible right of residence in the self-acquired property of her mother-in-law merely by virtue of marriage—Where the property was purchased by the mother-in-law long after the marriage, she never resided therein with the daughter-in-law, and the premises were occupied only by permission granted to the son and his family, the property does not constitute a “shared household” within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Act—The daughter-in-law's right of residence is enforceable primarily against her husband and not against the self-acquired property of the mother-in-law. (Paras 34, 38–40, 43). B. Property L...
(7) DELHI
Mutual Consent
A. Special Marriage Act, 1954—Sections 28 and 29—Mutual Consent Divorce—Waiver of Statutory Waiting Period—Held: The statutory bar against presentation of a divorce petition within one year of marriage under Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act is not absolute and may be waived in exceptional circumstances—Where the marriage remained purely notional, with no cohabitation, no consummation, no social or familial acceptance and both parties mutually sought dissolution, insistence on the statutory waiting period would serve no meaningful purpose and would only prolong hardship—The Court is empowered to exercise its discretion to waive the one-year period and permit the petition for divorce by mutual consent to be entertained. (Paras 16–20). B. Special Marriage Act, 1954—Section 29—Exc...
(8) DELHI
Void marriage
A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Sections 5(i) and 11—Void Marriage—Prior Subsisting Marriage—Customary Divorce—Held: A marriage solemnized during the subsistence of an earlier valid marriage is void ab initio under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act—A plea of dissolution of the earlier marriage by custom can succeed only upon strict proof of a valid custom having the force of law—The burden of proving such custom lies upon the party asserting it and the custom must be shown to be ancient, certain, reasonable and continuously observed—Mere knowledge of the respondent regarding the appellant's previous marriage does not validate a marriage otherwise void in law. (Paras 4, 6, 13–18, 22). B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Sections 24 and 25—Maintenance Pendente Lite and Permanen...
(9) ALLAHABAD
Rejection of plaint
A. Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021—Sections 1(3), 4, 9 and 38(1)—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Maintainability of SCC Suit—Held: Where the plaint itself admits the applicability of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 to the premises in question, acknowledges the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, and invokes Sections 4 and 9 of the Act for enforcement of tenancy obligations and recovery of enhanced rent, the dispute is governed exclusively by the statutory mechanism under the Act. In view of the express bar contained in Section 38(1), the jurisdiction of the civil court, including the SCC Court, stands excluded and the plaint is liable to be rejected as barred by law. (Paras 14–18). B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—Order VII Rule 11&md...
(10) KERALA
Demand notice
A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Statutory Demand Notice—Essential Requirements—Held: A valid notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act must specifically demand payment of the cheque amount dishonoured by the bank—Mere mention of the cheque number, date or information regarding dishonour is insufficient—The expression “the said amount of money” occurring in provisos (b) and (c) mandates a clear and specific demand of the actual amount covered by the cheque, enabling the drawer to make payment and avoid penal consequences. (Paras 9–11). B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Defective Demand Notice—Effect on Prosecution—Held: Where the statutory notice fails to mention the specific amount demanded, there ...
