(1) SUPREME COURT
Service Law
A. Service Law—Departmental proceedings—Reinstatement—Effect of substituted minor penalty—Held: Where an order of removal is ultimately substituted by a minor penalty pursuant to judicial directions, the penalty must relate back to the date of the original removal and cannot be reckoned from the date of the subsequent order. The period of the minor penalty having expired notionally, the employee becomes entitled to consideration for promotion and consequential service benefits in accordance with law. (Paras 20 to 22) B. Service Law—Promotion—Notional promotion—Back wages and pensionary benefits—Held: An employee wrongly kept out of service due to illegal departmental action is entitled to promotion from the date his juniors were promoted, with all consequential benefits. Where such promot...
(2) SUPREME COURT
A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Section 340 read with Section 195(1)(b)—Initiation of prosecution for perjury—Held: Before directing prosecution under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court must record a prima facie satisfaction that the party has made a false statement or given false evidence and must further record that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate such proceedings—Mere existence of an incorrect or wrong statement is insufficient to invoke Section 340. (Paras 6 to 12, 16) B. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Sections 193, 199 and 200—False statement—Wrong statement—Distinction—Held: There is a material distinction between a wrong statement and a false statement—A false statement necessarily imports a deliberate intention to deceive and ...
(3) SUPREME COURT
Maintainability
A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 482 read with Section 397—Maintainability of quashing petition despite availability of revisional remedy—Held, the availability of an alternative remedy of revision under Section 397 of the CrPC does not, by itself, operate as a bar to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC; the two provisions operate in distinct spheres, and the inherent power, being merely saved and not conferred by the CrPC, cannot be held ousted by the mere availability of a revisional remedy, following Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370, Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 30, and Akanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3688—Nomenclature of a petition is immaterial, and a High Court may treat a pet...
(4) SUPREME COURT
Preliminary enquiry
A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015—Section 2(33), Section 2(54)—Classification of offences—Offence under Section 302 IPC (death or imprisonment for life)—Whether "heinous offence" or "serious offence" (fourth category)—Held, an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, which prescribes punishment of "death or imprisonment for life", carries life imprisonment as its minimum punishment by necessary implication, since a court convicting for such offence has no discretion to award any lesser sentence, and the use of the disjunctive "or" between "death" and "imprisonment for life" merely confers discretion between the two punishments and does not imply absence of a minimum sentence—Consequently, Section 302 IPC squarely ...
(5) SUPREME COURT
Circumstantial evidence
A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Appellate jurisdiction—Appeal against acquittal distinguished from appeal against conviction—Held, though the appellate court is equally empowered to re-appreciate evidence in both categories of appeals, in an appeal against acquittal, the acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence and a higher threshold applies for reversal, and if the view of acquittal is one of the possible views, it is not disturbed, following Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104—In an appeal against conviction, however, the presumption of innocence stands displaced upon conviction, and the case against the convict is further reinforced where concurrent findings of conviction are rendered by the Trial Court and the High Court. (Para 13) B. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Sections 302, 364, 201, ...
(6) SUPREME COURT
Insurance Policy
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Section 147(5); Contract of insurance—Extra-territorial use of vehicle—Clause "Limitations as to Use" vis-à-vis clause "Geographical Area"—Held, an insurance policy must be read as a whole and its clauses harmoniously construed, and one clause cannot be cherry-picked in isolation—Where the policy's "Limitations as to Use" clause covered use of the vehicle under a valid "permit" within the meaning of Section 2(31) of the MVA, in general and unqualified terms without any geographical limitation, and the offending vehicle possessed a special permit issued under Section 88(8) of the MVA specifically authorising travel from Durg to Nepal, the vehicle was covered by the policy notwithstanding the "Geographical Area" clause rest...
(7) SUPREME COURT
A. Finance Act, 1994—Section 65(19) read with Section 65(105)(zzb)—"Business Auxiliary Service"—Taxability of commission/profit margin received by oil marketing companies from CNG supplier—Held, the transaction between MGL and the respondent-Corporations for supply and sale of CNG through the outlets of the respondent-Corporations constituted a "Principal and Agent" relationship and not a "Buyer and Seller" relationship, and the services rendered by the respondent-Corporations to MGL in relation to promotion, marketing and sale of CNG fell squarely within the definition of "Business Auxiliary Service" under Section 65(19), attracting service tax under Section 65(105)(zzb)—CESTAT's finding that the respondent-Corporations were buying and reselling CNG on a "Prin...
(8) SUPREME COURT
Gang Rape
A. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 376-D—Gang rape—Sentencing—Doctrine of proportionality—Held, while determining sentence for gang rape, courts must balance the gravity of the offence, societal interest, deterrence, conduct of the offender, possibility of reformation, age, criminal antecedents and other relevant circumstances—Sentence must be proportionate to the offence, being stern where warranted and tempered with mercy where justified—In the present case, sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life was modified to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years with benefit of remission, considering the appellant’s young age, absence of criminal antecedents, good prison conduct and possibility of reformation. (Paras 6–10) B. Criminal Jurisprudence&mda...
(9) SUPREME COURT
A. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Sections 294(b) & 506(ii)—Obscene words and criminal intimidation—Ingredients of offences—Held, mere use of abusive, insulting, or vulgar expressions, even if offensive or indecent, does not by itself constitute an offence under Section 294(b) IPC—To attract the provision, the words used must possess a lascivious character, have a tendency to arouse sexual thoughts or feelings, and be of such nature as to cause annoyance to others in a public place—Similarly, a mere threat uttered during a quarrel or heated exchange, without proof of intention to cause alarm or to compel the person threatened to do or abstain from doing any act, does not satisfy the requirements of criminal intimidation under Section 506(ii) IPC. (Paras 11 to 19) B. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section...
(10) SUPREME COURT
A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 299(1)—Evidence recorded in absence of accused—Absconding accused—Admissibility of deposition—Held, Section 299(1) constitutes an exception to the general rule that evidence must be recorded in the presence of the accused—A deposition recorded in the absence of an accused becomes admissible in a subsequent trial only where it is established that, at the time of recording such evidence, the accused was absconding and there existed no immediate prospect of his arrest—The prosecution must prove the existence of these statutory conditions, though the absence of a formal order of the Magistrate recording such satisfaction is not, by itself, sufficient to exclude the evidence. (Paras 12, 14, 20 & 22) B. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 299(1)&md...
(1) UTTARAKHAND
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 447—Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 173(2)—Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988—Section 13(1)(a) read with Section 13(2)—Transfer of pending trials upon investigation being taken over by CBI—Held, where investigation into the offences was, pursuant to directions of the High Court, taken over and completed by the CBI after re-registration of the FIR, and a final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. was filed before the Court of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, CBI, Dehradun—the notified Court having jurisdiction to try cases investigated by the CBI—continuation of the connected miscellaneous criminal cases arising out of the earlier charge-sheets before the Court of the Special Judge, P.C. Act, Kumaon Region, Haldwani, would not be ...
(2) UTTARAKHAND
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 447—Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 125—Transfer of case—Maintenance proceedings—Convenience of applicant residing away from the court of institution—Participation through video conferencing—Held, transfer of proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. from the Family Court, Almora, to the Family Court, Haridwar, sought on the ground of the applicant's alleged permanent shift to Haridwar and the resultant hardship of travel, cannot be granted where the record shows that the applicant has already participated in the proceedings through video conferencing, appeared in person and tendered her evidence before the trial Court despite the claimed shift, and is, in fact, working and residing in District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh, and not at Harid...
(3) UTTARAKHAND
Quashing of FIR
A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 482—Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 376—Quashing of FIR/charge sheet—Physical relationship on alleged false promise of marriage—Consent—Held, where the complainant and the applicant came in contact through a dating application, developed a relationship over a considerable period during which the applicant frequently visited the complainant, and the first and subsequent instances of physical relations took place with the free consent of the complainant, the subsequent failure of the relationship to culminate in marriage cannot retrospectively convert consensual physical relations into an offence under Section 376 IPC on the false pretext of marriage—Reliance placed on Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, (2025) 5 SCC 749, and Samadhan v. Stat...
(6) SIKKIM
A. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 376, Section 376(2)(j) and Section 511—Rape—Proof of penetration—Attempt to commit rape—Distinction—Victim, a 90-year-old woman suffering from advanced dementia, was incapable of making any statement and died during investigation—Sole eyewitness found accused on top of victim with trousers lowered and victim partially unclothed—Forensic evidence established presence of accused's semen on victim's clothing, but medical evidence did not prove penetration or genital injuries—Held, penetration, however slight, remains the indispensable ingredient of the offence of rape even after the expanded definition under Section 375 introduced by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013—While penetration may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, suc...
(8) MADHYA PRADESH
Maintenance, Jurisdiction
A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Section 125—Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956—Section 20(3)—Maintenance—Major unmarried daughter—Merely because an application for maintenance by a major unmarried daughter was filed under Section 125 CrPC instead of Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, relief cannot be denied where the Court otherwise possesses the jurisdiction to grant such relief—The Family Court, being competent to entertain proceedings under both enactments, rightly awarded interim maintenance, and no interference was called for. (Paras 6, 8, 9 and 15) B. Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956—Section 20(3)—Maintenance of major unmarried daughter—The statutory requirement for claiming maintenance under Section 20(3) is that the majo...
(10) DELHI
A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Section 9—Interim measures—Dispute arising out of licence agreement—Where the petitioner challenged a demand notice raising concession fee on the ground that the respondent had unilaterally increased the number of train coaches contrary to the terms of the licence agreement, the Court held that an arbitrable dispute existed between the parties and directed that the disputes be resolved through arbitration. (Paras 3, 5 to 8, 11 and 13) B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Sections 9 and 11—Arbitration agreement—Appointment of Arbitrator—In view of the arbitration clause contained in the licence agreement and the existence of disputes relating to the validity of the demand notice and enhancement of concession fee, the Court appointed a Sole Arb...