(1) SUPREME COURT
Mandatory injunction
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 100 read with Order XXI—Second Appeal—Mandatory Injunction—Held: In a second appeal, the High Court cannot set aside concurrent decrees granting mandatory injunction and substitute them with a direction for payment of monetary compensation in the absence of any such prayer by the plaintiff or consent of the legal representatives—Such an exercise travels beyond the scope of the decree and amounts to rewriting the relief granted by the courts below—The reversal of concurrent findings without justification results in miscarriage of justice. (Paras 5–6). B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 100—Substantial Question of Law—Scope of Interference—Held: Interference in a second appeal is permissible only upon formulation and determination o...
(2) SUPREME COURT
Compensation
A. Constitution of India, 1950—Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c), 19(1)(d) and 21—Right to Walk—Fundamental Right—Held: The right to walk safely on well-demarcated footpaths is an integral facet of the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 and the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution—Pedestrians are entitled to safe, accessible and obstruction-free footpaths, which must receive priority over motorised traffic—Correspondingly, urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities and panchayats are under a constitutional obligation to create, maintain and protect adequate pedestrian infrastructure to ensure the effective enjoyment of this fundamental right. (Paras 4, 9, 13, 20). B. Constitution of India, 1950—Article 21 read with Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Ri...
(3) SUPREME COURT
Amendment
A. Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957—Sections 59(d), 92 and 95(1)—Disciplinary Authority—Effect of 1993 Amendment—Held: By virtue of the amendment introduced by Act 67 of 1993 with effect from 01.10.1993, the Commissioner became the statutory disciplinary authority for all municipal officers and employees—The pre-existing Delhi Municipal Corporation Services (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959, insofar as they prescribed different disciplinary authorities, stood overridden to the extent of inconsistency—Such position continues unless fresh regulations are framed under Section 95(1) in conformity with the amended statutory scheme. (Paras 30, 63, 73–81). B. Statutory Interpretation—Amendment by Substitution—Prospective Operation—Held: A statutory provision substituted by ...
(4) SUPREME COURT
A. Constitution of India, 1950—Article 21—Right to life with dignity—Protection of differently-abled persons—State's obligation—Held: The right to life under Article 21 includes the right to live with dignity, particularly for persons with disabilities living in extreme poverty—The State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure availability of basic amenities and social support to such vulnerable persons—Accordingly, the State of Odisha was directed to provide all essential facilities to a visually impaired individual and his elderly mother and to file a status report regarding compliance. (Paras 4–9) B. Persons with Disabilities—Social welfare and rehabilitation—Legal aid and livelihood—Held: A visually impaired person is entitled not only to welfare benefits ...
(5) SUPREME COURT
A. Right to Information Act, 2005—Section 24(4)—Exemption of State Organisations from RTI Act—Validity of Notification—Held: Exemption under Section 24(4) is confined only to “intelligence and security organisations” established by the State Government—The Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (SPE), constituted for investigating corruption and specified criminal offences by public servants, cannot be treated as an intelligence or security organisation—Notification dated 25.08.2011 excluding the SPE from the purview of the RTI Act was held ultra vires Section 24(4) and struck down to that extent. (Paras 13–22). B. Right to Information Act, 2005—Sections 8(1)(h) and 24(4)—Information Relating to Sanction for Prosecution—Disclosure of Information—Held: In...
(6) SUPREME COURT
A. Recruitment to Public Service—Motor Vehicle Inspector Grade-II Recruitment, Tamil Nadu—Workshop Experience Certificates—Retrospective Approval of Workshops—Held: Candidates who had acquired the requisite workshop experience from Government-approved workshops could not be denied consideration merely because renewal of workshop approval was pending or subsequently granted with retrospective effect—Where re-verification conducted by the Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department established that candidates possessed more than one year of qualifying experience, their candidature was required to be considered for inclusion in the select list—Recruitment process directed to be completed expeditiously in view of the prolonged litigation. (Paras 10–13). B. Public Employment—Recruitment Process&mdas...
(7) SUPREME COURT
Election
A. Constitution of India, 1950—Article 329(b)—Election Matters—Rejection of Nomination Paper—Maintainability of Writ Petition—Held: The constitutional bar contained in Article 329(b) prohibits judicial interference in electoral matters during the course of an election—A challenge to the rejection of a nomination paper constitutes a challenge to the election process itself and can be raised only through an election petition after completion of the election—Neither Article 32 nor Article 226 can be invoked to question rejection of a nomination at an intermediate stage of the election. (Paras 6, 9–10, 12–13). B. Representation of the People Act, 1951—Section 33A—Disclosure of Criminal Cases in Affidavit—Rejection of Nomination—Held: The legality or correctness o...
(8) SUPREME COURT
Res Judicata
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 11 and Explanation IV—Constructive Res Judicata—Scope and Application—Held: The doctrine of constructive res judicata requires a party to raise in earlier proceedings all grounds which might and ought to have been raised—However, its application is not mechanical and must be tested in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of each case, particularly in disputes involving family members—Where the plaintiff’s rights already stood acknowledged and protected under a prior deed and were not in dispute, it could not be presumed that a stronger claim had been consciously abandoned so as to attract the bar of constructive res judicata—The contrary view taken by the High Court was unsustainable. (Paras 6, 8, 12–14). B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908&mda...
(9) SUPREME COURT
Enhancement of Compensation
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Sections 165 and 166—Liability for Accident Caused by Falling Tree Branch—Negligence of Municipal Authorities—Held: It is the duty of municipal and horticultural authorities to ensure proper maintenance, inspection and upkeep of roadside trees so as to prevent foreseeable harm to the public—Where a tree branch fell on a stationary autorickshaw during rainfall causing serious injuries to the victim, the authorities could not escape liability by merely invoking the doctrine of Act of God when preventive maintenance and risk management measures were found wanting—Compensation was therefore held payable to the victim. (Paras 9, 11, 15) B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Sections 165 and 166—Expression “Arising out of the Use of a Motor Vehicle”—Scope and...
(10) SUPREME COURT
Compensation
A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Compensation for Death of Homemaker—Recognition of Homemakers as “Nation Builders”—Held: The contribution of a homemaker cannot be measured merely in economic terms or confined to notional income—Homemakers perform multifaceted functions involving household management, caregiving, emotional support and family welfare, making them indispensable contributors to society—Recognising such foundational contributions, the Court described homemakers as “Nation Builders” and held that compensation in motor accident claims must reflect both their economic and non-economic contributions to the family. (Paras 10, 13, 15, 20). B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Compensation—Death of Homemaker—Introduction of “Loss of Domestic Care” as Independen...
(1) DELHI
A. Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957—Section 471—Limitation—Section 471 prescribes a mandatory and substantive limitation period of six months for filing a complaint regarding offences under the DMC Act before the Municipal Magistrate. The limitation runs from the date of commission of the offence or the date it first comes to the knowledge of the competent municipal authority. Non-compliance is incurable and vitiates the prosecution. (Paras 34, 41, 45) B. Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957—Sections 466A, 467, 469 & 471—Institution of Prosecution—Prosecution for offences under the DMC Act may be initiated either by a direct complaint before the Municipal Magistrate by the competent municipal officer or through an FIR leading to a police investigation, provided the complaint or information ...
(2) DELHI
Child witness
A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012—Sections 3, 5(m) & 6—Penetrative Sexual Assault—Penetration "to any extent" is sufficient to constitute penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act. In cases involving very young children, absence of significant external injuries is not decisive where the child's testimony is credible and is corroborated by prompt disclosure and medical evidence indicating penetration. (Paras 46–48, 51) B. Evidence—Child Witness—Identification of Accused—Failure of a child victim to identify the accused in Court after a considerable lapse of time does not by itself weaken the prosecution case where the identity of the accused is otherwise established through reliable evidence and remains undisputed during trial. (Paras 34–40, 84...
(3) DELHI
A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Sections 34 & 37—Scope of Judicial Review—Interpretation of contractual terms is primarily within the domain of the arbitral tribunal. Courts exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 cannot substitute their own interpretation merely because another view is possible and may interfere only where the tribunal's interpretation is one that no reasonable or fair-minded person could adopt. (Paras 42, 43) B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Sections 34 & 37—Concurrent Findings—Where the arbitral tribunal, the court under Section 34, and an earlier Division Bench in proceedings under Section 37 have concurrently upheld the interpretation of a contractual clause, a subsequent appellate court ought not to take a contrary view in respect of the ...
(4) DELHI
A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Sections 34 & 37—Scope of Judicial Review—The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 37 is no wider than that under Section 34. An appellate court cannot reappreciate evidence or independently assess the merits of the arbitral award and may interfere only where the award suffers from patent illegality, perversity, arbitrariness, or violation of the fundamental policy of law. A plausible view adopted by the arbitral tribunal on the evidence is immune from judicial interference. (Paras 71, 72) B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Sections 34 & 37—Appreciation of Evidence—An arbitral award based on documents produced by the employer itself, including progress reports and balance-work statements, cannot be termed perverse merely because the employer...
(5) JAMMU & KASHMIR
A. Penal Code, 1860—Sections 376 & 511—Attempt to Commit Rape—Where medical evidence does not establish penetration but proves sexual assault through injuries, ejaculation, and genital rubbing causing perineal laceration, conviction under Section 376 is unsustainable and is liable to be altered to one under Section 376 read with Section 511 for attempt to commit rape. (Paras 7, 40, 48, 59, 60) B. Penal Code, 1860—Section 376—Delay in Lodging FIR—Delay in reporting sexual offences, arising from social stigma, parental concern, and hesitation in approaching authorities, is not by itself fatal to the prosecution case and does not necessarily impair its credibility. (Paras 12, 17, 21, 24, 51, 53, 54) C. Penal Code, 1860—Section 376—Appreciation of Evidence—The prosecutrix's t...
(6) BOMBAY
A. Court Fees Act, 1859 (Bombay)—Section 46—Court Fee Exemption for Women—The exemption from payment of court fees available to women under the Government Notification dated 1-10-1994 is confined to specified categories, namely maintenance, matrimonial property disputes, violence, and divorce. Succession and partition suits do not qualify unless they fall within the notified categories. (Paras 10, 15, 18, 20–23) B. Court Fees Act, 1859 (Bombay)—Section 46—Violence—Scope of Exemption—The exemption on the ground of violence is attracted only where violence constitutes the foundation or an inseparable part of the cause of action. Mere allegations of physical, financial, or economic violence in a suit of a different nature are insufficient to claim exemption from court fees. (Paras 25–2...
(7) BOMBAY
A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Section 9—Post-Award Interim Relief—Grant of interim protection after an arbitral award requires the unsuccessful party to establish exceptional circumstances warranting departure from the award. Mere pendency of a challenge or an arguable case is insufficient; relief is justified only where refusal would cause irreparable prejudice despite a successful challenge. (Paras 42, 65) B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Sections 9 & 36(3)—Consent Terms—Suppression of Material Facts—Non-disclosure of material consent terms governing the continuation and expiry of a bank guarantee, coupled with delay in seeking relief, disentitles a party to equitable and discretionary relief under Section 9, particularly where such terms were negotiated by commercial...
(8) BOMBAY
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order VIII Rule 6A—Counter-Claim—A defendant may raise a counter-claim in respect of any right or claim accruing before or after institution of the suit, provided it arises before filing the written statement, with the object of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and enabling complete adjudication of disputes in a single suit. (Paras 23–26) B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order VIII Rule 6A—Belated Counter-Claim—No absolute time limit exists for filing a counter-claim before framing of issues. The Court may permit a delayed counter-claim after considering the explanation for delay, prejudice to the opposite party, stage of the proceedings, and the ends of justice. (Paras 19, 25, 30) C. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order VIII Rule 6A—Judicial Discretion...
(9) RAJASTHAN
A. Constitution of India—Article 21—Illegal Detention—Habeas Corpus—Compensation—Continued detention of a person despite suspension of sentence by the competent appellate authority constitutes a gross violation of personal liberty under Article 21. Public law compensation is warranted for the period of unlawful confinement, particularly where the authorities had knowledge of the suspension order but failed to secure the detenue's release. (Paras 1, 9, 13, 19, 24, 31, 38, 45, 50(i)) B. Administrative Law—Judicial Discipline—Compliance with Judicial Orders—Public authorities are bound to obey judicial and quasi-judicial orders unless stayed or set aside by a competent forum. Wilful non-compliance with an appellate order suspending sentence, resulting in illegal detention, amounts to gra...
(10) BOMBAY
Second appeal
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 100—Second Appeal—The jurisdiction of the High Court in a second appeal is confined to substantial questions of law arising from the judgment of the first appellate court. Findings of fact may be interfered with only where material evidence has been ignored, inadmissible evidence has been relied upon, or the findings are otherwise perverse. (Paras 10, 11, 13) B. Evidence Act, 1872—Sections 68, 72 & 90—Proof of Old Attested Documents—The presumption under Section 90 extends only to the genuineness of the execution of a document produced from proper custody after thirty years and does not prove its contents. Where attesting witnesses are alive and available, execution of an attested document must ordinarily be proved by examining them, and reliance on Section 9...