Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, Section 148 - Revision jurisdiction upon deposit of 20% - Whether the word "may" to be interpreted as "shall" - In Muskan Enterprises (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the word 'may' appearing in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, shall be read as 'may', not as 'shall' - Therefore, now the appellate court, before directing the appellant to deposit 20% of the compensation amount has to exercise judicial discretion - That means, the appellate court has to explain and to give reasons as to why it will be directing the appellant to deposit 20% of the compensation amount - The impugned order, directing the appellant to pay 20% of the compensation amount, is without any reasoning -  Therefore, the impugned order is bad in law - Accordingly, the prayer of the peti...

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 138—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sections 397, 401—Revision petition filed by Convict, in cheque dishonour case—Defence of repayment done to the Son of Complainant—Convict failed to lead evidence—As per Section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, burden of prove in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fall if no evidence at all were given on either side—Similarly, as per Section 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proving is to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person—In the instant case the complainant has not admitted the receipt of Rs.1,07,000.00 (Rupees one lakh seven thousand) only fro...

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)—Section 498A—Cruelty—Dowry Demand as a Key Element—Marital Discord vs. Legal Cruelty—The legislative intent behind the enactment of Section 498A IPC was to protect married women from harassment and cruelty, particularly arising from dowry demands—The term ‘cruelty’ under this provision is generally understood in the context of harassment, physical or mental torture, or persistent ill-treatment linked to dowry demands—In the absence of specific allegations of dowry demand, mere quarrels between spouses or a demand for divorce by the husband or his relatives may not automatically constitute cruelty under Section 498A IPC—Courts have held that the establishment of cruelty requires an assessment of the nature and gravity of the acts in question—The conduc...

In WP (C) No. 1520/2013, the petitioner challenged the rejection of its technical bid in a tender process, arguing that its annual turnover exceeded Rs. 2 crores when considering the turnover of three firms owned by the same proprietor—The court rejected this argument, stating that the NIT required the bidder, M/s. D.B. Enterprise, to meet the turnover criteria independently and not rely on the turnover of unrelated firms—The court emphasized that the tender process specifically asked for a reputed dealer of steel utensils with a turnover of Rs. 2 crores in any one of the last three years, and since the petitioner’s turnover was insufficient, the rejection of the bid was justified—The court distinguished this case from precedents like New Horizon Ltd. and G.R. Engineering Works Ltd., as the petitioner was not part ...

Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order 39 Rule 1—Interim Injunction Against Statutory Bodies—The Division Bench allowed an appeal and set aside the Trial Court’s order granting an interim injunction against the Airports Authority of India’s (AAI) debarment order—The case revolved around the grant of interim relief under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC, which requires the establishment of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury—The court emphasized that while interim relief can be granted in aid of the main relief sought, courts must also weigh public interest considerations, particularly when granting relief against statutory bodies performing public functions—The Division Bench observed that the Trial Court had failed to properly consider critical factors such as (i) the maintainab...

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Causation of Death in Motor Accident Claims—Standard of Proof in Establishing Nexus Between Accident and Death—The primary issue in the appeal was whether the death of ‘S’ on 27.01.2014 was a direct consequence of the injuries sustained in a vehicular accident that occurred on 31.12.2012—The appellant, an insurance company, contended that there was insufficient medical or legal evidence to establish a proximate causal link between the accident and the eventual death, as there was a significant time gap of over one year—The court reiterated that in motor accident claims, strict proof of causation akin to criminal proceedings is not required—A reasonable nexus between the accident and the death must be established through medical records, expert opinions, or circumstan...

Constitution of India, 1950—Article 226—Scope of Writ Jurisdiction in Foreigners’ Tribunal Orders—The petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the opinion of the Foreigners’ Tribunal declaring her a foreigner under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955—The High Court reiterated that its writ jurisdiction is limited to reviewing whether the Tribunal’s findings suffer from perversity, are unsupported by evidence, or involve an error of law apparent on the face of the record—It emphasized that the writ court cannot act as an appellate authority or re-appreciate evidence to reach a different conclusion—In the present case, the petitioner contended that the Tribunal’s finding was based on erroneous appreci...

Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 100—Scope and Limitations of Second Appeal—The appellant filed a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, challenging the concurrent findings of the Civil Judge, Barpeta, and the Munsiff No.1, Barpeta—The High Court reiterated that its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is confined strictly to cases involving a substantial question of law, which must be explicitly formulated before the appeal is entertained—The court clarified that a second appeal does not permit a reappreciation of evidence as done in a first appeal under Section 96 CPC—The High Court cannot interfere with factual findings unless they are based on no evidence, on inadmissible evidence, or where the conclusions of the lower courts are perverse, contrary to mandatory legal provisions, or against binding Sup...

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)—Section 406 and 420—Distinction Between Civil Dispute and Criminal Offense—The court reiterated that a mere breach of promise or contract does not automatically amount to cheating under Section 420 IPC or criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC—To establish the offense of cheating, it must be demonstrated that the accused had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the very inception of the transaction—Likewise, a breach of trust constitutes a criminal offense only when there is clear evidence of misappropriation with mens rea (criminal intent)—In the present case, the complainant’s own statements failed to indicate any fraudulent intent or misappropriation at the beginning of the transaction—The court observed that disputes arising from contractual obligati...

Electricity Act, 2003—Section 127—Limited Scope of High Court’s Writ Jurisdiction in Electricity Disputes—The High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate in nature, particularly concerning factual determinations made by the Appellate Authority under Section 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003—The court does not interfere with findings of fact unless there is a manifest and apparent error on the face of the record, such as a clear ignorance or utter disregard of the law leading to grave injustice—It is reiterated that mere errors of fact or the possibility of a different interpretation do not warrant interference unless the findings are perverse or unreasonable—The court emphasized that when two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate authorit...