Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 482—Quashing of FIR—The High Court has inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR when, even if the allegations are accepted at face value, they do not disclose any prima facie offence—This evaluation must be based solely on the contents of the complaint or FIR, without assessing the truth or reliability of the claims—Courts must consider the FIR in its entirety, not isolated statements, to determine if criminality is made out. Penal Code, 1860—Sections 406, 420—Criminal vs—Civil Dispute: In cases where the core of the dispute pertains to breach of contract, work execution, unpaid dues, or similar civil issues—Especially when arbitration or civil proceedings are already initiated — the use of criminal law may amount to misuse&m...

Evidence Act, 1872—Section 154—Hostile Witness—Party may cross-examine its own witness with the court’s permission—Such a witness, often termed ‘hostile,’ does not render their entire testimony inadmissible—Their evidence remains part of the record and must be evaluated carefully—The court, applying caution and discretion, can accept parts of the testimony that are corroborated by other reliable evidence—The 2005 amendment, introducing sub-section (2), affirms that the party cross-examining its own witness is still entitled to rely on any part of that evidence. Evidence Act, 1872—Section 154—Interested witnesses, the law draws a distinction—A related witness is someone who has familial ties to the victim and may naturally be present at the scene—Their t...

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 482—Banking Law—The classification of borrower accounts as fraudulent under the RBI Master Directions on Frauds (01.07.2016), the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between administrative actions taken by banks and criminal proceedings initiated by law enforcement—The former, being regulatory in nature, falls within the purview of RBI and banking institutions, while the latter, governed by the CrPC, is under the jurisdiction of investigating agencies like the police or CBI—The principles of natural justice—particularly audi alteram partem—must be adhered to before classifying an account as fraudulent, given the serious civil and penal consequences akin to blacklisting—However, these principles do not apply at the stage of FIR registration. Crimin...

Government contracts and tenders, the scope of judicial review is limited and circumscribed—Courts are expected to exercise restraint and intervene only where the decision-making process is tainted by mala fides, is intended to unduly favour a party, is patently arbitrary or irrational, or where public interest is adversely affected—Tender evaluation and contract award are inherently commercial activities, where the principles of natural justice and equity apply in a restricted manner—Procedural errors or differences in assessment do not warrant judicial interference if the decision is bona fide and in public interest. Government Contracts & Tenders—The government, in its role as custodian of public funds, possesses inherent discretion to accept or reject bids, or to cancel the tender process, even after bid...

Plot allotments—In a series of applications concerning the long-standing dispute over plot allotments in Okhla Enclave, Faridabad, the Supreme Court addressed impleadment and allotment claims under the NPNL (No Profit No Loss) category—Applicants including Raja Ram Prajapati and others sought inclusion in the list of eligible claimants, citing full land cost payments and partial or non-payment of development charges—The Court held they may be considered in the second phase post requisite payments and land availability—In a separate plea, N.R—Chauhan, a senior citizen, sought recognition of his rights over Plot No. J-367, having fulfilled all obligations and holding supporting documents since 1995—The Court directed the Special Committee to reconsider his claim—Similarly, Ms—Kiran Bala Nair&r...

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985—Section 20(b)(ii)(C)—Special Leave Petition arising from an interim bail order passed by the Odisha High Court, the Supreme Court condoned the delay and granted regular bail to the petitioner, who was accused under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act and had already undergone approximately three years of incarceration—Taking into account the period of custody and the overall circumstances of the case, the Court held that a case for regular bail was made out and directed the petitioner’s release on usual terms as determined by the concerned Court—Importantly, the Court expressed concern over a recurring pattern in cases from the Odisha High Court where repeated interim bail is granted to the same applicant—While recognizing that interim bail may be ne...

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985—Sections 19—The Supreme Court examined the maintainability of an Original Application (O.A.) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, in light of the limitation provisions under Sections 20 and 21—The respondent, a retired public servant, belatedly claimed benefits under the ACP Scheme in 2016, despite having already received financial upgradations under the MACP Scheme in 2010 and 2015 without protest—The Court held that a non-statutory representation filed years after the cause of action does not revive limitation or defer its accrual—The period of limitation under Section 21 begins either from the date of a final order or, in cases of representation, after six months if no final order is made—provided such representation is statutory or necessitat...

Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972—Section 21(1)(a)—The landlord’s bona fide requirement must be assessed by the Prescribed Authority based on factors such as financial condition, absence of alternative business, and family needs—The Appellate Authority must offer cogent reasons to reverse such findings and cannot misinterpret or trivialize the landlord’s stated position—Upon the death of the landlord during the proceedings, Section 21(7) permits legal representatives to continue the case based on their own need without requiring a fresh application—In determining comparative hardship under the proviso to Section 21(1)(a), the tenant’s long possession and failure to make genuine efforts for alternative accommodation weigh against them—Rul...

Evidence Act, 1872—Section 114(g)—This case highlights key principles of administrative law and disciplinary proceedings—The Court ruled that disciplinary proceedings initiated with a vague and indefinite chargesheet that lacks material particulars violate natural justice and must be quashed—The denial of the right to cross-examine a crucial witness, particularly when their testimony is relied upon, further compounds this violation, making the findings unsustainable—Additionally, the non-production of crucial departmental files during the inquiry led to an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, suggesting that the missing documents would have been detrimental to the State's case—The Court also emphasized that a criminal acquittal on similar charges, based on the failure to prove...

(A) Limitation Act, 1963 Articles 58, 59, and 65—Limitation—Sale Deed—Cancellation and Possession—In a suit seeking cancellation of sale deeds and recovery of possession, the relief of cancellation is the primary relief, while possession is merely ancillary—As per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, such a suit must be filed within three years from the date the plaintiff gains knowledge of the sale deeds—Plaintiffs cannot abandon the relief of cancellation midway through proceedings in an attempt to circumvent the limitation period by relying solely on Article 65, which governs possession—The suit remains barred by limitation if the primary relief itself is time-barred—Thus, timely filing is essential for maintainability. (Paras 30 to 36) (B) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Section 52&m...