(1) SUPREME COURT
Quashing of FIR
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 482—Quashing of FIR—The High Court has inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR when, even if the allegations are accepted at face value, they do not disclose any prima facie offence—This evaluation must be based solely on the contents of the complaint or FIR, without assessing the truth or reliability of the claims—Courts must consider the FIR in its entirety, not isolated statements, to determine if criminality is made out. Penal Code, 1860—Sections 406, 420—Criminal vs—Civil Dispute: In cases where the core of the dispute pertains to breach of contract, work execution, unpaid dues, or similar civil issues—Especially when arbitration or civil proceedings are already initiated — the use of criminal law may amount to misuse&m...
(2) SUPREME COURT
Hostile witness
Evidence Act, 1872—Section 154—Hostile Witness—Party may cross-examine its own witness with the court’s permission—Such a witness, often termed ‘hostile,’ does not render their entire testimony inadmissible—Their evidence remains part of the record and must be evaluated carefully—The court, applying caution and discretion, can accept parts of the testimony that are corroborated by other reliable evidence—The 2005 amendment, introducing sub-section (2), affirms that the party cross-examining its own witness is still entitled to rely on any part of that evidence. Evidence Act, 1872—Section 154—Interested witnesses, the law draws a distinction—A related witness is someone who has familial ties to the victim and may naturally be present at the scene—Their t...
(3) SUPREME COURT
Quashing of FIR
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 482—Banking Law—The classification of borrower accounts as fraudulent under the RBI Master Directions on Frauds (01.07.2016), the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between administrative actions taken by banks and criminal proceedings initiated by law enforcement—The former, being regulatory in nature, falls within the purview of RBI and banking institutions, while the latter, governed by the CrPC, is under the jurisdiction of investigating agencies like the police or CBI—The principles of natural justice—particularly audi alteram partem—must be adhered to before classifying an account as fraudulent, given the serious civil and penal consequences akin to blacklisting—However, these principles do not apply at the stage of FIR registration. Crimin...
(4) SUPREME COURT
Government contracts and tenders, the scope of judicial review is limited and circumscribed—Courts are expected to exercise restraint and intervene only where the decision-making process is tainted by mala fides, is intended to unduly favour a party, is patently arbitrary or irrational, or where public interest is adversely affected—Tender evaluation and contract award are inherently commercial activities, where the principles of natural justice and equity apply in a restricted manner—Procedural errors or differences in assessment do not warrant judicial interference if the decision is bona fide and in public interest. Government Contracts & Tenders—The government, in its role as custodian of public funds, possesses inherent discretion to accept or reject bids, or to cancel the tender process, even after bid...
(5) SUPREME COURT
Allotment of Plot
Plot allotments—In a series of applications concerning the long-standing dispute over plot allotments in Okhla Enclave, Faridabad, the Supreme Court addressed impleadment and allotment claims under the NPNL (No Profit No Loss) category—Applicants including Raja Ram Prajapati and others sought inclusion in the list of eligible claimants, citing full land cost payments and partial or non-payment of development charges—The Court held they may be considered in the second phase post requisite payments and land availability—In a separate plea, N.R—Chauhan, a senior citizen, sought recognition of his rights over Plot No. J-367, having fulfilled all obligations and holding supporting documents since 1995—The Court directed the Special Committee to reconsider his claim—Similarly, Ms—Kiran Bala Nair&r...
(6) SUPREME COURT
Bail
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985—Section 20(b)(ii)(C)—Special Leave Petition arising from an interim bail order passed by the Odisha High Court, the Supreme Court condoned the delay and granted regular bail to the petitioner, who was accused under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act and had already undergone approximately three years of incarceration—Taking into account the period of custody and the overall circumstances of the case, the Court held that a case for regular bail was made out and directed the petitioner’s release on usual terms as determined by the concerned Court—Importantly, the Court expressed concern over a recurring pattern in cases from the Odisha High Court where repeated interim bail is granted to the same applicant—While recognizing that interim bail may be ne...
(7) SUPREME COURT
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985—Sections 19—The Supreme Court examined the maintainability of an Original Application (O.A.) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, in light of the limitation provisions under Sections 20 and 21—The respondent, a retired public servant, belatedly claimed benefits under the ACP Scheme in 2016, despite having already received financial upgradations under the MACP Scheme in 2010 and 2015 without protest—The Court held that a non-statutory representation filed years after the cause of action does not revive limitation or defer its accrual—The period of limitation under Section 21 begins either from the date of a final order or, in cases of representation, after six months if no final order is made—provided such representation is statutory or necessitat...
(8) SUPREME COURT
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972—Section 21(1)(a)—The landlord’s bona fide requirement must be assessed by the Prescribed Authority based on factors such as financial condition, absence of alternative business, and family needs—The Appellate Authority must offer cogent reasons to reverse such findings and cannot misinterpret or trivialize the landlord’s stated position—Upon the death of the landlord during the proceedings, Section 21(7) permits legal representatives to continue the case based on their own need without requiring a fresh application—In determining comparative hardship under the proviso to Section 21(1)(a), the tenant’s long possession and failure to make genuine efforts for alternative accommodation weigh against them—Rul...
(9) SUPREME COURT
Evidence Act, 1872—Section 114(g)—This case highlights key principles of administrative law and disciplinary proceedings—The Court ruled that disciplinary proceedings initiated with a vague and indefinite chargesheet that lacks material particulars violate natural justice and must be quashed—The denial of the right to cross-examine a crucial witness, particularly when their testimony is relied upon, further compounds this violation, making the findings unsustainable—Additionally, the non-production of crucial departmental files during the inquiry led to an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, suggesting that the missing documents would have been detrimental to the State's case—The Court also emphasized that a criminal acquittal on similar charges, based on the failure to prove...
(10) SUPREME COURT
Conditional sale deed
(A) Limitation Act, 1963 Articles 58, 59, and 65—Limitation—Sale Deed—Cancellation and Possession—In a suit seeking cancellation of sale deeds and recovery of possession, the relief of cancellation is the primary relief, while possession is merely ancillary—As per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, such a suit must be filed within three years from the date the plaintiff gains knowledge of the sale deeds—Plaintiffs cannot abandon the relief of cancellation midway through proceedings in an attempt to circumvent the limitation period by relying solely on Article 65, which governs possession—The suit remains barred by limitation if the primary relief itself is time-barred—Thus, timely filing is essential for maintainability. (Paras 30 to 36) (B) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Section 52&m...
(1) ALLAHABAD
Matrimonial cruelty and dowry death
Penal Code, 1860—Section 304-B, 498-A, 302 r/w 34—Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 372—Evidence Act, 1872—Section 106—Dowry death and matrimonial cruelty—Appeal against acquittal—Acquittal upheld—No proximate nexus between cruelty and death—Presumption u/s 106 Evidence Act inapplicable—Where the deceased died due to consumption of poison (aluminium phosphide) and the post-mortem revealed no external injuries or signs of strangulation, and the medical evidence was inconclusive regarding homicidal administration, the burden u/s 106 of the Evidence Act could not be shifted onto the accused merely on the basis of his presence in the house—Absent a proximate and cogent link between alleged matrimonial cruelty for dowry and the unnatural death and in light of the decea...
(3) ORISSA
Maintenance
(A) Air Force Act, 1950, Section 92(i)—Maintenance to wife through Air Force Act—By executing decree passed under Sections 2(f), 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005—Petitioner's name is not entered as wife of Respondent in the service records—Another person's name is entered as wife of Respondent in the service records—Petitioner has failed to show that the opposite party Nos.1 to 3 are statutorily bound in terms of Section 91 of the Air Force Act, 1950, to deduct amounts awarded by Domestic Violence Act Court (contrast with Central Government or or any prescribed officer) towards maintenance and house rent to be paid by the opposite party No.4 to the petitioner, no writ of mandamus is liable to be issued. (Para 9.1) (B) Protection of Women from Domestic Vi...
(4) GUJARAT
Permanent Alimony
Permanent alimony. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sections 13(1)(i-a) and 25—Appeal to impugn Alimony—Court decided Family Suit and decreed dissolution of the marriage—However, while allowing the suit, the Family Court directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.70 lakhs towards permanent alimony to the respondent-wife under Sec.25 of the Act—The appeal has been filed only to the extent that the Family Court directed payment of permanent alimony—Trial Court has specifically opined that neither of the parties were willing to disclose their income and resources though, documents on record suggested otherwise. The parties may be alive to the issue that in the event the Court was to order separation, some permanent alimony needed to be worked out as we have held in the earlier part of this judgement. Neithe...
(5) GUJARAT
Acquittal
Acquittal upheld. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 138—Appeal to impugn Acquittal—On minute appreciation of the evidence before the learned Trial Court as discussed above the learned Trial Court has appreciated that the accused has discharged his liability and successfully rebutted the presumption with the standard of preponderance of probability in the cross examination of the complainant and has raised a probable defence regarding the existence of a legally enforceable debt as per the judgment—The learned trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in proper perspective and there does not appear to be any infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal—The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Tria...
(6) GAUHATI
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, Section 148 - Revision jurisdiction upon deposit of 20% - Whether the word "may" to be interpreted as "shall" - In Muskan Enterprises (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the word 'may' appearing in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, shall be read as 'may', not as 'shall' - Therefore, now the appellate court, before directing the appellant to deposit 20% of the compensation amount has to exercise judicial discretion - That means, the appellate court has to explain and to give reasons as to why it will be directing the appellant to deposit 20% of the compensation amount - The impugned order, directing the appellant to pay 20% of the compensation amount, is without any reasoning - Therefore, the impugned order is bad in law - Accordingly, the prayer of the peti...
(8) RAJASTHAN
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 138—Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 391—Revision petition by convict in cheque dishonour case—To impugn order of Sessions Court, which denied the right to produce further evidence—FIR etc—Allowing the introduction of this evidence would serve the interests of justice, ensuring that all relevant and material facts are comprehensively examined prior to the rendering of a final judgment—Such an approach would not only safeguard the appellant's right to a fair hearing but also enable the court to render a just and informed decision, based on a comprehensive evaluation of all the facts and evidence available—The judiciary possesses discretionary authority to evaluate such applications, and this discretion is grounded in principles of justice and fair...
(9) ALLAHABAD
Territorial jurisdiction
Suit dismissed. Special Marriage Act, 1954, Section 31—Territorial Jurisdiction of the Court to which petition should be made—Concerned District Court within the local limits of whose Original Civil Jurisdiction, the marriage was solemnized, the defendant at the time of presentation of petition resides, parties to marriage last resided together or in the case of wife is the petitioner, where she residing on the date of presentation of plaint but in the present case, none of the criteria fulfills by the petitioner—The Jurisdictional District Court is only empowered to receive, try and adjudicate any suit, petition of the matrimonial proceedings—It is made clear that this Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff only on the ground of maintainability and this Court has not gone into the merit of the suit&m...
(10) DELHI
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, Section 138—Quashing petition by Accused in the Cheque dishonour case—Held: Considering the material on record, the documents adduced by the petitioner cannot be said to be of such sterling and unimpeachable quality that it merits the quashing of the summons and consequential proceedings thereof—This Court can exercise its jurisdiction only upon unimpeachable and uncontroverted evidence being placed on record, however, in the absence of such evidence, the fact whether the accused person is responsible for the affairs of the accused company becomes a factual dispute, which is to be seen during trial—Needless to say, it will be open to the petitioner to justify the arguments taken by him regarding his retirement from the accused firm and non-involvement in the transaction during the c...