The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act, 2013, land acquisition proceedings that provide multiple opportunities for hearing objections, consider them, and comply with statutory requirements like Social Impact Assessment, Rehabilitation & Resettlement Scheme, and Section 19 Declaration, are in line with due process and natural justice—Special provisions under Section 10, restricting the acquisition of irrigated multi-cropped land to safeguard food security, do not apply to land primarily used for non-agricultural purposes, such as a resort with fruit-bearing trees—Consent terms from prior litigation concerning a different dispute do not create a legitimate expectation against acquisition, particularly where the landowner compromised without compensation&mdash...

Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971—Section 3(k)—The State Government can issue directions to the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) on policy matters but cannot direct specific actions in individual redevelopment projects, such as appointing a new developer unless aligned with a broader State policy—A direction referencing a policy on stalled projects (e.g., GR dated 25.05.2022) falls within permissible policy-related directions—Allegations of bias in concurrent proceedings (Section 13(2) termination of a developer and State policy for a new developer) must show actual prejudice, not mere apprehension—Additionally, administrative orders must be justified within the order itself and cannot be supplemented by affidavits unless clarifying existing reasons—The initi...

Constitution of India, 1950—Article 21—Right to Speedy Trial—Bail on Ground of Long Incarceration—An undertrial's right to a speedy trial under Article 21 is infringed by prolonged pre-trial detention—In cases where the accused has been incarcerated for over 13 years with no foreseeable conclusion to the trial, the Constitutional Court may grant bail, considering the systemic delays and balancing the gravity of the offence with the right to liberty—This applies even in serious or heinous crimes, acknowledging the right to speedy justice (Paras 2-28). Bail Jurisprudence—Bail is the rule, jail is the exception—Pre-conviction deprivation of liberty is a form of punishment and should only be applied to ensure trial attendance or prevent tampering with evidence—Bail aims to secure th...

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Sections 166 & 168—Just Compensation—Medical Insurance Proceeds—Non-Deductibility—Amounts received by a motor accident victim under a Mediclaim or Medical Insurance policy, which arise from a contractual arrangement involving premium payments by the insured, are not liable to be deducted from the “just compensation” awarded under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act—Such benefits, being independent contractual gains, cannot diminish the statutory liability of the tortfeasor or their insurer for medical expenses incurred due to the accident—Statutory vs. Contractual Entitlements—Compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is a statutory remedy, distinct from personal insurance benefits—The principle of avoiding double benefit does not justify dedu...

Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order XXXVII Rule 1(2)(b)(i)—Seeking recovery of a debt or liquidated demand, it is essential that the debt arises from a written contract, as confirmed by legislative amendments in 1966 and 1976—A summary suit cannot be maintained based solely on an honoured cheque, as it represents a completed payment transaction and does not satisfy the criteria for a contract or instrument specified under Order XXXVII Rule 1(2)—When a defendant raises triable issues or provides a reasonable defence, unconditional leave to defend should generally be granted, with conditions such as deposits being reserved for cases with weak but not frivolous defences—Documents or communications relied upon as admissions of liability must be interpreted in context, particularly when matrimonial disputes or relate...

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Section 13-B—A distinction is drawn between original mutual consent divorce petitions and those converted from pending proceedings (e.g., under Sections 9 or 13) based on agreed terms—While unilateral withdrawal of consent is generally permissible before the decree in original Section 13-B petitions, such liberty may not extend to converted petitions where consent terms have been acted upon—In such cases, withdrawal is restricted by principles of estoppel if (a) the other spouse has relied on the consent terms and suffered prejudice (e.g., transferred property, withdrawn cases), and (b) the withdrawing party fails to demonstrate sufficient and bona fide reasons—Courts must scrutinize the bona fides of withdrawal applications, particularly where substantial benefits under the cons...

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 141—Vicarious Liability of Directors when the Cheque was signed—Ingredients— In Criminal law, a person is liable for his own acts and not for the acts of others—There are few exceptions incorporated in the provisions of I.P.C. new B.N.S—Company is an artificial entity but having legal existence—It works through natural persons. But Company being juristic person, it is liable in law—At the same time, the persons who are involved in the process are also liable—But you cannot drag every person employed in the Company—There are certain parameters laid down in the Acts governing the subject. Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act deals with the principle of vicarious liability when company is an accused. Section is in two parts&mdas...

Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order XXXIX Rule 11—The Petitioner, wife in a Hindu Marriage Petition, challenged the order dated 11th January 2024 passed by the 6th Joint Civil Judge Senior Division, Sangli, rejecting her application to strike out the Respondent husband’s defense under Order XXXIX Rule 11 (Bombay Amendment) of the CPC—The wife contended that the Respondent had violated the maintenance order by failing to pay Rs. 1,500 per month and an additional Rs. 1,000 per month, as directed by the court—The trial court dismissed the application, stating only Rs. 1,500 per month was granted—However, it was established that arrears of Rs. 25,000 had accumulated by March 2025—The court found that the trial court's order was perverse, as it failed to consider the arrears—Consequently, the Hi...

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005—Sections 2(a), 2(f)—An “aggrieved person” is defined as a woman who is or has been in a domestic relationship and alleges domestic violence, thereby excluding male respondents from claiming the status of an aggrieved person—The definition of “shared household” applies to the household where the aggrieved woman lives or has lived, and the protections under the Act are primarily available to the woman—Section 19(1)(b) empowers the Magistrate to pass a residence order, directing the respondent (husband) to remove himself from the shared household if domestic violence is established, irrespective of ownership rights—The Act prioritizes the protection of women over proprietary interests—The husband cannot resist such an order based ...

The Petitioners, tenants of a dilapidated property in Mumbai, sought a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution, directing MHADA to issue a notice under Section 79-A(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, permitting the tenants to redevelop the property—The Petitioners contended that despite the property being in a C-1 category (beyond repair), MHADA had failed to take necessary actions due to ownership disputes between Respondent Nos—4 and 5—The Court, however, found the petition premature—The Deputy Chief Engineer had already declared the building unsafe and directed MHADA to take appropriate steps—As per Section 79-A, the landlord was given three months to redevelop the property from January 2, 2025, with a six-month extension if no action was taken—The Court h...